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INTRODUCTION 
Never send a human to do a machine’s job.1 
 Unmanned aerial systems (“UAS”),2 commonly known as “drones,” are 
growing increasingly popular in both the public and private sectors.3 As UAS 
popularity grows, many are anxious that the government may utilize UAS to 
                                                        
1  THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999). 
2  UAS go by many other names, including the colloquial term, “drones,” as well as Un-
manned Aircraft Systems (UAS), Unmanned Aircraft (UA), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV), Remotely Operated Aircraft (ROA), and Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS). 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Frequently Asked Questions, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
https://web.archive.org/web/20141228005400/https://www.faa.gov/uas/faq (last modified 
July 23, 2014, 10:50 AM) [hereinafter UAS Frequently Asked Questions] (“Currently the 
FAA and most of the international community uses the term ‘UA’ or ‘UAS’ for the UA Sys-
tem. . . . The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) considers RPAS distinct 
from Autonomous RPAS, which do not require human action after takeoff. Both are subcat-
egories of UAS.”). Also, the popular term “quadcopter” is often used to describe a small, 
four-rotor UAS. What Is a Quadcopter?, QUADCOPTERHQ.COM (Aug. 31, 2013), 
http://quadcopterhq.com/what-is-a-quadcopter (“A quadcopter is multi-rotor copter with four 
arms, each of which have a motor and a propeller at their ends.”). 
3  Using technology provided by Google called “Google Trends,” we might infer that public 
interest in “Unmanned Aerial Vehicle” (and similar search terms) has never been higher, 
spiking at the end of 2014. See Unmanned Aerial Vehicle: Aircraft Type, GOOGLE TRENDS, 
http://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=%2Fm%2F0g2bc (last visited Nov. 13, 2015) 
(suggesting that public interest in UAVs has increased approximately 150 percent from De-
cember 2011 to December 2014, and 900 percent from December 2005). Likely, UAS are so 
popular because they are both affordable and fun. UAS open the skies up to the everyday 
person without having to obtain a pilot license and a manned aircraft, or having to learn to 
fly more difficult traditional model aircraft. See Michael Stothard, Flying Cameras Herald 
Age of the ‘Dronie,’ FIN. TIMES: TECH. (Dec. 22, 2014, 10:16 AM), http://www.ft.com 
/intl/cms/s/0/8b282b54-88f4-11e4-ad5b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3ku24fgkr (“Lego was an 
amazing toy 20 years ago. You could create a whole world. But today’s kids are different 
and they require something more special and technological,” said the chief executive of Par-
rot, a French drone manufacturing company). 
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violate privacy rights, especially in private homes.4 This note examines whether 
the Fourth Amendment prevents warrantless UAS surveillance of our homes, 
an issue that will likely vex courts in the near future. 
This note explores a hypothetical case that may become a typical UAS sur-
veillance scenario. Law enforcement, acting without a warrant (on bare suspi-
cion or an anonymous tip) will operate a small UAS with an attached camera to 
investigate and film the interior of a suspect’s home or backyard. Flying at a 
low altitude,5 the government will obtain aerial photographs or video capturing 
incriminating evidence against the suspect that the government could not have 
otherwise obtained from another lawful vantage point (at least not photographs 
or video of the same quality, or from such close proximity). To obtain this in-
criminating evidence otherwise would have required the police to physically 
trespass into a constitutionally protected area or violate criminal privacy laws. 
However, the government will argue that the evidence was clearly visible from 
a “lawful” aerial vantage point: the flight path of the UAS. 
Whether such surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment will likely de-
pend on the development of two separate issues. The first issue is whether the 
Supreme Court will update its Fourth Amendment doctrine to meaningfully 
limit warrantless technological surveillance. This will depend on whether the 
Court adopts a test that does not diminish its protections upon the proliferation 
of new technologies.6 The second issue is whether legislators preserve our ex-
pectations of privacy by limiting the ability of private citizens to use UAS to 
spy on their neighbors. In theory, effective enforcement of such regulations 
should preserve our “reasonable expectation[s] of privacy.”7 
                                                        
4  See JOEL D. LIEBERMAN ET AL., UNLV CTR. FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE POLICY, AERIAL 
DRONES, DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE, AND PUBLIC OPINION OF ADULTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 
(2014), http://www.unlv.edu/sites/default/files/page_files/27/CCJP-AerialDrones-2014.pdf; 
TERANCE D. MIETHE ET AL., UNLV CTR. FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE POLICY, PUBLIC ATTITUDES 
ABOUT AERIAL DRONE ACTIVITIES: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 1 (2014), http://www 
.unlv.edu/sites/default/files/page_files/27/CCJP-PublicAttitudesAboutAerialDrones-
2014.pdf; see also Sandra Fulton, Police Hunger for Drones May Be Growing, but So Are 
Privacy Concerns, ACLU: WASH. MARKUP (Jan. 16, 2014, 3:06 PM), https://www.aclu.org 
/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/police-hunger-drones-may-be-growing-so-
are-privacy; Halima Kazem, San Jose Police’s New Drone Prompts Privacy Concerns, 
ALJAZEERA AM. (Nov. 28, 2014, 2:13 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/11/28 
/san-jose-police-snewdronepromptsprivacyconcerns.html. 
5  This note explores various altitudes, but will primarily discuss surveillance from 30–100 
feet. 
6  Specifically, it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will expand the technologi-
cal trespass doctrine from Kyllo v. United States to incorporate technology that is in “general 
public use.” See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (limiting its holding to cir-
cumstances in which “the technology in question is not in general public use” (emphasis 
added)). 
7  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Governments 
might protect our privacy from UAS by enacting new legislation or by finding ways to en-
force already existing privacy laws against UAS operators. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 647(j)(1) (West Supp. 2015) (“Any person who looks through a hole or opening, into, or 
otherwise views, by means of any instrumentality, . . . the interior of a bedroom, bathroom, 
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 The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine bifurcates into two pri-
mary lines of cases: (1) common-law trespass cases8 and (2) reasonable expec-
tation of privacy cases.9 The common-law trespass cases further divide into two 
sub-doctrines: traditional physical trespass doctrine10 and the new technological 
trespass doctrine.11  
The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Doctrine 
Under the reasonable expectation of privacy test, warrantless UAS surveil-
lance of our homes will probably comply with the Fourth Amendment, absent 
legislative regulation of private drone use. As drones become increasingly pop-
ular among private consumers, the reasonableness of our expectations of priva-
cy from drones wanes.12 To combat this, legislators might preserve our privacy 
by limiting the ability of private drone users to spy on their neighbors. 
Additionally, three seminal aerial surveillance cases13 solidify the conclu-
sion that we presently have no reasonable expectation of privacy from drones. 
These cases held that naked-eye surveillance of a constitutionally protected ar-
ea, such as the home or curtilage, from a lawful aerial vantage point is not a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment, at least where the government does not 
                                                                                                                                 
changing room, fitting room, dressing room, or tanning booth, or the interior of any other 
area in which the occupant has a reasonable expectation of privacy, with the intent to invade 
the privacy of a person or persons inside [is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor].”). 
8  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–54 (2012) (reaffirming by plurality opinion 
the viability of the common-law trespass doctrine); see also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 
1409, 1414 (2013) (reaffirming Jones by majority opinion). 
9  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
10  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945, 949–54. 
11  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (“[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology any information re-
garding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physi-
cal ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search—at least where (as 
here) the technology in question is not in general public use.” (citation omitted)). 
12  The reasonableness of our privacy expectations from private UAS operators is already 
eroding, and UAS are already in “general public use.” See, e.g., Rebecca J. Rosen, So This Is 
How It Begins: Guy Refuses to Stop Drone-Spying on Seattle Woman, ATLANTIC (May 13, 
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/05/so-this-is-how-it-begins-guy-
refuses-to-stop-drone-spying-on-seattle-woman/275769 (“New technologies may present 
new ways of violating people’s privacy . . . . It will take courts years to figure out how to 
apply our laws to our age of drones (and years for legislators to revise them—they’re not, 
after all, perfect), but we’re not starting from scratch. That said, police . . . will need to actu-
ally enforce existing laws, or they’re not all that helpful.”). 
13  See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (involving an unwarranted naked-eye observa-
tion of the curtilage of a home from a manned helicopter operating at 400 feet, in compliance 
with FAA regulations for helicopters); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (involving 
an unwarranted naked-eye observation of the curtilage of a home from a manned, fixed-wing 
aircraft operating at 1000 feet, lawfully within navigable airspace); Dow Chem. Co. v. Unit-
ed States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (involving high-resolution camera observation and photog-
raphy of an “open field”—a constitutionally unprotected area—from a manned, fixed-wing 
aircraft operating lawfully within navigable airspace at 1,200; 3,000; and 12,000 feet). 
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observe “intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage.”14 
Further, when viewing a constitutionally unprotected area, the government may 
utilize high-resolution cameras.15 Although the Supreme Court has never found 
aerial surveillance to violate the reasonable expectation of privacy test, it has 
yet to rule on the constitutionality of unmanned, low altitude UAS surveillance 
of the home. Nonetheless, with the already widespread use of drones by private 
citizens, it appears unlikely that the Court will find our expectations of privacy 
to be reasonable absent effective legislative intervention. 
The Common Law Trespass Doctrine 
A warrantless UAS surveillance of the home, in which the UAS flies above 
roof-level, will also comply with the Fourth Amendment under the common-
law physical trespass test.16 Although a property owner owns the airspace 
above and around one’s property (to a limited altitude),17 the airspace higher 
than the roof of the house is simply not an area that is protected by the Fourth 
Amendment (it is not within the “curtilage” of the home).18 Under the common-
law physical trespass test, the government does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment when it trespasses on private property, unless it enters a house or its curti-
lage (the area immediately surrounding the house).19 In contrast, the physical 
trespass test provides no protection to non-curtilage real property (i.e., “open 
fields”).20 The private airspace above the roof of the house is more like an open 
field than the curtilage of the home.21 Therefore, the government probably does 
                                                        
14  Riley, 488 U.S. at 452 (“As far as this record reveals, no intimate details connected with 
the use of the home or curtilage were observed . . . .”). Accord Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 (“In 
an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasona-
ble for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from 
being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet. The Fourth Amendment 
simply does not require the police traveling in the public airways at this altitude to obtain a 
warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.”). 
15  See Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 239. 
16  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–54 (2012). 
17  United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 263–65 (1946) (“We have said that the airspace is 
a public highway. Yet it is obvious that if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the 
land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. 
. . . The landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or 
use in connection with the land.”); see also McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 
1110, 1120 (Nev. 2006) (“Thus, the landowners own the usable airspace above their property 
up to 500 feet, subject to intrusion by lawful air flight.”). 
18  See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (providing a four-factor test to de-
termine whether an area is part of the “curtilage” of the home and therefore protected by the 
Fourth Amendment). 
19  See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176–77, 181 (1984) (reaffirming the validity of 
the open fields doctrine under Katz); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). 
20  Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176–77, 181; Hester, 265 U.S. at 59. 
21  Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176–77, 181; Hester, 265 U.S. at 59; see also Dow Chem. Co. v. 
United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (comparing the area around an industrial complex to 
an open field). The open fields doctrine is a limitation on both the Katz reasonable expecta-
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not need a search warrant to fly through the airspace above the roof-level of 
private property. However, when a drone drops to a very low altitude (i.e., be-
low and within the walls of the backyard), it is likely that it has entered a con-
stitutionally protected area, wherein the government needs a warrant.  
The Technological Trespass Doctrine 
Most important of these Fourth Amendment doctrines, the technological 
trespass doctrine set forth in Kyllo v. United States,22 may invalidate warrant-
less drone surveillances of the home. This relatively new doctrine requires the 
government to obtain a warrant when it utilizes technology to gather infor-
mation about the interior of a home, and when the only alternate means of ob-
taining this information would be to trespass on a constitutionally protected ar-
ea.23 However, the Court has not applied this doctrine to technologies that are 
“in general public use,”24 a classification that likely applies to drones.25 
If the Court limits the Kyllo technological trespass doctrine to apply only to 
those technologies “not in general public use,” the technological trespass doc-
trine will suffer from the same limitations as the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy test: both tests will provide little constitutional protection from widely 
popular technologies, such as drones. However, even if the Supreme Court 
adopts the “not in general public use” limitation, it may limit the reach of this 
limitation, and require the government to obtain a warrant when it wishes to use 
popular technology in an uncommon manner. This interpretation of the “not in 
general public use” exception would allow legislators to protect constitutional 
privacy rights by limiting the way in which private citizens use UAS. 
Overview 
Part I of this note will examine the capabilities, uses, and benefits of UAS. 
Part II will examine the three primary Fourth Amendment doctrines that will 
apply to government UAS surveillance of the home. Part III will apply these 
doctrines to several variations of a hypothetical UAS surveillance case. 
I. BACKGROUND ON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 
A. The Capabilities, Uses, and Benefits of Unmanned Aerial Systems 
 UAS range dramatically in size, capability, and function. “They may have 
a wingspan as large as a Boeing 737 or smaller than a radio-controlled model 
                                                                                                                                 
tion of privacy test and the common-law trespass test. See, e.g., Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176–77; 
Hester, 265 U.S. at 59. 
22  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
23  Id. 
24  See id. (containing dicta limiting this doctrine to technologies “not in general public 
use”). 
25  See supra note 3 (discussing the popularity of drones in the general public). 
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airplane.”26 Some are going to be as small as a hummingbird,27 a golf ball,28 or 
even a bee.29 UAS can be remotely piloted or can fly autonomously, guiding 
itself.30 
 The American Civil Liberties Union divides UAS technology into the fol-
lowing five categories: (1) Large, fixed-wing aircraft for long-term high-
altitude surveillance or military operations; (2) Small, fixed-wing aircraft; (3) 
“backpack” craft, such as “quadcopters,” designed to be carried and operated 
by a single person; (4) hummingbirds (i.e., the “Nano Hummingbird” by Aero-
Vironment, intended for stealth operation that has a wingspan of only 6.5 inch-
es and weighs less than a AA battery); and (5) blimps.31 Unlike drones, 
“manned aircraft are expensive to purchase, operate and maintain, and this ex-
pense has always imposed a natural limit on the government’s aerial surveil-
lance capability. Now that surveillance can be carried out by unmanned air-
craft, this natural limit is eroding.”32 Also, drones are less conspicuous than 
manned aircraft. For these reasons, drones provide distinct advantages to law 
enforcement and private drone operators alike. These advantages drive popular 
speculation that UAS surveillance will become frequent. 
In terms of surveillance, UAS serve as a set of wings, so to speak, for near-
ly any imaging technology a government or private user desires to set aloft. 
And while manned aircraft may also serve this function, unmanned aircraft al-
low UAS operators to safely fly lower and closer to the target than would be 
practical for manned aircraft. Further, a small drone may fly inside a building 
or peer through windows undetected. Or a large blimp or fixed wing aircraft 
operating on improved solar power could remain in the air for years for 
citywide surveillance.33 Furthermore, developers continue to attach increasingly 
                                                        
26  UAS Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 2. 
27  The Surveillance Hummingbird: Watch It Fly and Spy, TIME, http://content.time.com/time 
/video/player/0,32068,1281633027001_2099853,00.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2015) [here-
inafter The Surveillance Hummingbird] (showing first- and third-person videos of a hum-
mingbird-sized drone with an attached camera flying inside and outside of a building). 
28  U.S. Government to Use ‘Drones the Size of Golf Balls to Spy on American Citizens, 
DAILYMAIL.COM (Jun. 9, 2012, 12:45 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-21567 
20/Eye-sky-U-S-government-use-drones-size-GOLF-BALLS-spy-citizens.html (reporting on 
a thirty-page memorandum issued by Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley, which stat-
ed that “drones, some as small as golf balls, may be used domestically to ‘collect infor-
mation about U.S. persons.’ ”). 
29  See Sandeep Ravindran, Insect-Inspired Vision Helps These Tiny Robots Fly, 
MOTHERBOARD (June 17, 2014, 5:55 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/insect-inspired-
vision-helps-these-tiny-robots-fly. 
30  JAY STANLEY & CATHERINE CRUMP, ACLU, PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM AERIAL 
SURVEILLANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF DRONE AIRCRAFT 2 (2011), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/protectingprivacyfromaerialsurveillance.pdf. 
31  Id. at 2–3. 
32  Id. at 1. 
33  While current drone technology typically operates aloft for only a matter of hours, certain 
devices called High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) UAS will have the potential to oper-
ate in the air for extremely prolonged periods of time, enabling them to gather long-term in-
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powerful imaging technology that “increas[es] the chance that individuals will 
come under scrutiny from faraway aircraft without knowing it.”34 UAS have the 
ability to carry very high-powered cameras (with high-power zoom lenses) that 
will produce quality, high-resolution images and video from far away.35 There-
fore, drones have a wide range of capabilities that will open new doors for gov-
ernment surveillance. 
B. UAS Use by Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement  
 While academics and attorneys slowly debate the uncertain constitutionali-
ty of utilizing UAS for law enforcement functions, many law enforcement 
agencies throughout the United States are already using them.36 As discussed 
below, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Customs and Border Protection, 
and state and local law enforcement agencies all utilize UAS. 
1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
 The FBI has been utilizing UAS as far back as 2006 and has spent more 
than $3 million on unmanned aircraft as of 2014.37 FBI Director Robert S. 
                                                                                                                                 
formation about the ground. John Villasenor, Observations from Above: Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems and Privacy, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 495 (2013). Boeing is working on a 
HALE UAS called the SolarEagle, which will operate continually aloft in the stratosphere 
for up to five years. Press Release, Boeing Co., Boeing Wins DARPA Vulture II Program 
(Sept. 16, 2010), http://boeing.mediaroom.com/2010-09-16-Boeing-Wins-DARPA-Vulture-
II-Program. The solar-powered QinetiQ Zephyr stayed aloft for over two continuous weeks. 
See Andrew Chuter, Solar UAV Lands After Record 2 Weeks Aloft, DEF. NEWS (July 23, 
2010, 3:45 AM), http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20100723/DEFSECT01/7230304 
/Solar-UAV-Lands-After-Record-2-Weeks-Aloft. 
34  STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 30, at 5. 
35  Id. These capabilities will only improve with time. In addition, developers could equip 
UAS with night-vision and “see-though imaging” (technology that has the potential to pene-
trate walls). Id. Or, instead of imaging technology, one might equip “laser microphones” on-
to drones, which allow users to pick up audio occurring within a home. See Charles Arthur, 
Laser Spying: Is It Really Practical?, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2013, 3:34 PM) 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/22/gchq-warned-laser-spying-guardian-offices. 
Perhaps this is what the Supreme Court warned about in Dow Chemical: “An electronic de-
vice to penetrate walls or windows so as to hear and record confidential discussions of chem-
ical formulae or other trade secrets would raise very different and far more serious questions 
. . . .” Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986). 
36  See Shawn Musgrave, Finally, Here’s Every Organization Allowed to Fly Drones in the 
US, MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 6, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/every-
organization-flying-drones-in-the-us. For a list of at least some law enforcement agencies 
that have FAA permission (Certificates of Waiver or Authorization, or “COA”) to operate 
UAS for law enforcement purposes, see FAA List of COA Applicants: Shawn Musgrave 
Made This Request to Federal Aviation Administration of the United States of America, 
MUCKROCK, https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/faa-list-of-coa-app 
licants-9201/#files (click on “Files” tab; then follow “view” hyperlink under “Responsive 
Documents”) (last visited Nov. 13, 2015). 
37  Brian Bennett, FBI Has Been Using Drones Since 2006, Watchdog Agency Says, L.A. 
TIMES (Sep. 26, 2013, 4:14 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-fbi-
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Mueller III admitted that the agency uses UAS for surveillance domestically.38 
Mueller claimed that the Bureau uses drones only “in a very, very minimal way 
and very seldom,” and that the Bureau has “very few” drones.39 Nonetheless, 
the FBI apparently lacked meaningful self-regulation, relying on a case-by-case 
determination of the proper limitation of UAS use. Mueller claimed that the 
FBI was only in the “initial stages” of writing policies to limit privacy in-
fringements, and claimed that the “principal privacy limitations” were “very 
narrowly focused on particularized cases and particularized needs.”40 There-
fore, the FBI appears to be currently operating drones without meaningful poli-
cy limitations.41 
2. Customs and Border Protection 
The United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) operates “Pred-
ator” UAS (large, fixed-wing UAS similar to those used for military purposes 
abroad) along the United States border for surveillance.42 In addition, CBP has 
lent these drones to domestic law enforcement agencies for local law enforce-
ment purposes.43 CBP’s executive director, Lothar Eckardt, has stated that law-
                                                                                                                                 
using-drones-2006-20130926-story.html; Justice Department Spent Nearly $5M on Drones, 
CBS NEWS (Sep. 26, 2013, 9:37 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-department-
spent-nearly-5m-on-drones; Shawn Musgrave, Every Drone Mission the FBI Admits to Fly-
ing, MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 16, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/every-
drone-mission-the-fbi-admits-to-flying. 
38  Richard A. Serrano & Brian Bennett, FBI Uses Drones Inside U.S. for Spying, Director 
Says, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 19, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/19/nation/la-na-fbi-
mueller-20130620. Accord Shawn Musgrave, Where Is the Paper Trail for the FBI’s Drone 
Use?, MOTHERBOARD (June 20, 2013, 9:55 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/where-is-
the-paper-trail-for-the-fbis-drone-use (“Asked . . . whether the FBI uses drones and for what 
purposes, Mueller answered, ‘Yes, and for surveillance.’ [Asked] whether the FBI uses 
drones for surveillance on American soil, . . . Mueller confirmed with another terse ‘Yes.’ ”). 
39  Serrano & Bennett, supra note 38. 
40  Id. 
41  See, e.g., Jason Koebler, FBI Uses Drones for Surveillance, Without Clear Guidelines, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 19, 2013, 1:28 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles 
/2013/06/19/fbi-uses-drones-for-surveillance-without-clear-guidelines (reporting that the di-
rector of the Electronic Privacy Information Center’s domestic surveillance project finds the 
FBI’s lack of clear guidelines troubling: “Government agencies should be prohibited from 
flying drones in the United States without meaningful rules to guide that use.”). 
42  Elliot Spagat & Brian Skoloff, AP Exclusive: Drones Patrol Half of the Mexico Border, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 13, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/8015402c74 
80430badfe47df502eaa19 (according to the report, since March 2013, the government has 
operated about 10,000 drone flights over a stretch of about 900 miles along the U.S.-
Mexican border, and plans to expand the strategy to the Canadian border by the end of 
2015); see also Robert Valdes, How the Predator UAV Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM (Apr. 
1, 2004), http://science.howstuffworks.com/predator.htm (stating the advantages of predator 
UAS for military purposes). 
43  Brian Bennett, Police Employ Predator Drone Spy Planes on Home Front, L.A. TIMES 
(Dec. 10, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/10/nation/la-na-drone-arrest-20111211; 
Jennifer Lynch, Customs & Border Protection Logged Eight-Fold Increase in Drone Sur-
veillance for Other Agencies, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 3, 2013), https://www.eff.org 
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abiding people should not worry about the possibility that CBP will violate our 
privacy with these drones, because the cameras the drones carry “are unable to 
capture details like license plate numbers and faces on the ground.”44 However, 
the CBP’s drones carry some advanced sensors and imaging technology, in-
cluding visible-spectrum and infrared video, synthetic-aperture radar for 
change detection, and “Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar” (VADER). 
These features allow for the “persistent reconnaissance, surveillance, tracking, 
and targeting of evasive vehicles and people moving on foot in cluttered envi-
ronments.”45 
3. State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies 
 Police departments around the United States are buying drones, applying 
for FAA “Certificates of Waiver or Authorization” (“COA”),46 and many are 
already flying them. For example, law enforcement officials in Grand Forks, 
North Dakota, used a drone to track down two suspects that fled from the po-
lice, leading to their arrests.47 Further, CBP has conducted drone surveillance 
for the Texas Department of Public Safety, The North Dakota Bureau of Crim-
inal Investigation, and the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Investigation, for 
“missions rang[ing] from specific drug-related investigations, searches for 
missing persons, border crossings and fishing violations to general ‘surveil-
lance imagery’ and ‘aerial reconnaissance’ of a given location.”48 
 In 2006, the FAA investigated the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department 
(LASD) for operating a drone without its permission, and then declined to issue 
the LASD a COA to fly drones.49 An LASD official said that the department 
had no plans to spy on people, and that the drones would “most likely be used 
to track fleeing suspects, monitor hostage situations and search for missing 
                                                                                                                                 
/deeplinks/2013/07/customs-border-protection-significantly-increases-drone-surveillance-
other (“Recently released daily flight logs from [CBP] show the agency has sharply in-
creased the number of missions its [ten] Predator drones have flown on behalf of state, local 
and non-CBP federal agencies.”). 
44  Spagat & Skoloff, supra note 42. 
45  Jay Stanley, Up to 20% of Border Patrol Drone Flights Are Inside the United States, 
ACLU: FREE FUTURE (Oct. 2, 2014, 7:46 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/20-border-patrol-
drone-flights-are-inside-united-states?redirect=blog/technology-and-liberty-immigrants-
rights/20-border-patrol-drone-flights-are-inside-united. 
46 Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA), FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa 
.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/aaim/organizations/
uas/coa/ (last modified Nov. 14, 2014 1:20 PM). 
47  See Bennett, supra note 43; Jason Koebler, Police Used a Drone to Chase Down and Ar-
rest Four DUI Suspects in a Cornfield, MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 2, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://mo 
therboard.vice.com/read/police-used-a-drone-to-chase-down-and-arrest-four-dui-suspects-in-
a-cornfield (reporting that those arrestees “had the unlucky distinction of becoming the first 
Americans ever tracked down and arrested with the help of a police quadcopter.”). 
48  Lynch, supra note 43. 
49  See Lynn Doan & Ashraf Khalil, FAA Grounds Baca’s Plan for Eyes in the Sky, L.A. 
TIMES (June 22, 2006), http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jun/22/local/me-drone22. 
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children and hikers.”50 Many more examples of law enforcement plans to use 
UAS exist.51 
C. Public Awareness and Sentiment About Use of UAS 
 The University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Center for Crime and Justice Policy 
conducted multiple nationwide and statewide surveys on the general public’s 
attitude about domestic UAS use in the United States.52 According to these sur-
veys, 73 percent of respondents reported that they have heard or read about 
drone use for delivery services (i.e., mail or books) to private residences, 61 
percent were aware of the potential to use drones in remote areas for search and 
rescue operations, and 41 percent were aware of the potential to use drones in 
open public places to detect criminal activities.53 These results demonstrate that 
the public is generally aware of the growing use of drones. 
 It is not surprising that 93 percent of the public favors using drones in re-
mote areas to aid in search and rescue operations (i.e., finding missing or in-
jured persons).54 However, the public is evenly torn on whether law enforce-
ment should employ drones to detect criminal activities in open public places.55 
When asked about their level of concern about drone use for monitoring peo-
ple’s daily activities around the home, 72 percent responded that they are very 
concerned and only 9 percent responded that they are not concerned at all.56 
Most respondents oppose the use of drones for surveillance by federal, state, or 
local governments.57 Interestingly, many more respondents oppose drone sur-
veillance by private citizens.58 No doubt, such a high level of public concern 
should promote legislative solutions to prevent invasions of privacy by UAS.59 
                                                        
50  Id. 
51  See, e.g., Seattle Cancels Police Drone Program After Outcry over Privacy Issues, NBC 
NEWS (Feb. 8, 2013, 3:39 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/08/16903237-
seattle-cancels-police-drone-program-after-outcry-over-privacy-issues?lite; see also Melissa 
Pamer & Mark Mester, LAPD’s 2 Drones Will Remain Grounded During Policy Review, 
Police Commission Says amid Protest, KTLA (Sept. 15, 2014, 1:28 PM), http://ktla.com 
/2014/09/15/anti-spying-group-drone-free-lapd-to-protest-state-bill-that-would-allow-police-
drones. 
52  See LIEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 4; MIETHE ET AL., supra note 4; see also MARI 
SAKIYAMA ET AL., UNLV CTR. FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE POLICY, NEVADA VS. U.S. 
RESIDENTS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD SURVEILLANCE USING AERIAL DRONES 1 (2014), 
http://www.unlv.edu/sites/default/files/page_files/27/NevadaU.S.Residents'Attitudes.pdf 
(“Eighty-three percent of Nevada residents in this survey were opposed to using drones to 
monitor people’s daily activities around their home.”). 
53  MIETHE ET AL., supra note 4, at 2. 
54  Id. at 3. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. at 4. 
57  LIEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 5. 
58  Id. 
59  See id. at 6 (discussing the public policy impact and legislative challenges that likely arise 
from the public sentiment regarding drones, and stating that “legislative efforts to regulate 
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It remains to be seen how public sentiment will change as drones more fully 
integrate into society, especially if regulatory efforts fail. 
D. Drone Legislation and Regulation: Federal, State, and Local Law 
 Federal law surrounding UAS is unclear and in flux. Federal statutes and 
regulations governing aviation are far from relevant to the use of UAS, and in-
stead are tailored around manned flights from at least 400 to 500 feet above the 
ground (save helicopters, which sometimes may fly lower, when safe to do 
so).60 Hence, Congress directed the FAA to develop a plan for the integration of 
“civil” UAS61 into the national airspace by September 2015, via the FAA Mod-
ernization and Reformation Act of 2012 (“FMRA”).62 However, the FAA has 
dragged its feet in complying with the FRMA and promulgating drone regula-
tions, and might not comply until 2017.63 At the time of this writing, the FAA 
has proposed detailed drone regulations.64 Thankfully, the FAA has also pro-
vided an executive summary of these regulations.65 
 Federal aviation regulations are found in Title 14 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, notwithstanding the existence of several other regulation-like doc-
                                                                                                                                 
aerial drone usage in the areas of domestic surveillance face a major challenge. This chal-
lenge involves establishing public policy that achieves the delicate balance between (1) max-
imizing the benefits of this technology (i.e., increasing public safety through domestic sur-
veillance activities) and (2) minimizing its costs on individuals’ rights to privacy.”). 
60  See 14 C.F.R. § 91.119 (2015) (minimum safe altitudes); Busting Myths About the FAA 
and Unmanned Aircraft, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?news 
Id=76240 (last modified Mar. 7, 2014, 4:44 PM) [hereinafter Busting Myths] (“[M]anned 
aircraft generally must stay at least 500 feet above the ground.”). See generally 49 U.S.C. 
§ 44101 (2012); 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2015). 
61  Civil Operations (Non-Governmental), FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas 
/civil_operations (last modified Mar. 17, 2015, 10:42 AM) (defining “civil” as non-
governmental). 
62  FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332, 126 Stat. 11, 73 
(2012) (serving, in relevant part, as a directive by Congress to the FAA to update federal 
aviation regulations, but not as an enforceable statute or regulation in itself, beyond defining 
some of the boundaries of the FAA’s regulatory authority to regulate drones). 
63  See L. Gordon Crovitz, The Grinch Who Stole . . . Drones, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2014, 
7:04 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/l-gordon-crovitz-the-grinch-who-stole-drones-14198 
11476 (“The Government Accountability Office recently reported a ‘consensus of opinion’ 
that the FAA won’t have new rules before 2017.”). 
64  Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9543 
(proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45, 47, 61, 91, 101, 107, 
183). 
65  Id. at 9545–48. Of note, the FAA aims to require a minimum certification process for pri-
vate UAS operators, to limit UAS operation to “line of sight” flying (that is, the drone must 
stay within your direct, naked-eye vision), and to restrict UAS to below 500 feet. See id. at 
9546–47. However, these restrictions do not apply to hobbyist drones, when these drones 
meet the requirements of section 336 of Public Law 112-95 (“Special Rule for Model Air-
craft”). Id. at 9555, 9585. Hobbyist drones are those “flown strictly for hobby or recreational 
use,” and “operated in accordance with a community-based set of safety guidelines and with-
in the programming of a nationwide community-based organization.” Id. at 9585. 
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uments published by the FAA. These include an “Advisory Circular” that de-
tails optional guidelines for model aircraft users titled “Model Aircraft Operat-
ing Standards.”66 This document may reflect the basic framework of the FAA’s 
forthcoming drone regulations. 
Currently, several legal issues are unclear. For example, which currently 
enacted laws already proscribe drone use;67 what is the scope of federal authori-
ty, both Congressional and administrative, to regulate local use of drones; and 
what is the scope of state and local governments’ powers to regulate private 
and public drone use in light of the FAA’s authority? 
Whether federal regulation of aircraft (or unmanned aircraft) preempts 
state and local drone legislation is unclear. The FAA’s website claims that the 
FAA has preemptive authority over regulation of private drone use.68 However, 
the FAA probably does not have such broad and exclusive authority over drone 
laws. The Federal Aviation Act, granting the FAA its regulatory authority, has 
                                                        
66  FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., AC 91-57, ADVISORY CIRCULAR: MODEL 
AIRCRAFT OPERATING STANDARDS 1 (1981), http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Ad 
visory_Circular/91-57.pdf (“This advisory circular outlines, and encourages voluntary com-
pliance with, safety standards for model aircraft operators.”). The FAA released an un-
manned aircraft safety video, largely echoing the contents of the Advisory Circular. See Fed. 
Aviation Admin., Know Before You Fly, YOUTUBE (Dec. 22, 2014), https://www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=XF5Q9JvBhxM&feature=youtu.be. 
67  For example, a highly publicized National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) case 
decided whether current FAA regulations for manned aircraft proscribe commercial drones, 
or if commercial drones fall under the FAA’s exemption for model aircraft. Raphael Pirker, 
N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5730, No. CP-217, at 5 (Nov. 17, 2014) (holding that all aerial 
drones fall into the FAA’s definition of “aircraft” because of the “the clear, unambiguous 
plain language of 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6) and 14 C.F.R. § 1.1: an ‘aircraft’ is any ‘device’ 
‘used for flight in the air.’ This definition includes any aircraft, manned or unmanned, large 
or small.”). The board in Pirker concluded that the FAA has the authority to impose fines for 
reckless commercial operation of unmanned aircraft. Id. at 1–2. Presumably, this decision 
also means that the FAA has regulatory authority over private hobby unmanned aircraft as 
well, despite its historical choice to exempt those “aircraft” from federal regulations. See id. 
For a good overview of the lawfulness of private drone flights, see Tim Adelman, Can I Fly 
or Can’t I Fly? Drones in the Wake of the NTSB’s Pirker Opinion, THOMSON REUTERS: THE 
KNOWLEDGE EFFECT (Jul. 2, 2014), http://blog.thomsonreuters.com/index.php/can-i-fly-or-
cant-i-fly-drones-in-the-wake-of-the-ntsbs-pirker-opinion, but note that Adelman published 
this article in reference to the initial Pirker holding, which the NTSB reversed later that year. 
Nonetheless, the article provides useful insights into the legal landscape of private drone 
flights. 
68  Fact Sheet—Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
http://www.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=14153 (Jan. 6, 2014) (“[The 
FAA’s authority] generally preempts any state or local government from enacting a statute 
or regulation concerning matters—such as airspace regulation—that are reserved exclusively 
to the U.S. Government. For example, a state law or regulation that prohibits or limits the 
operation of an aircraft . . . generally would be preempted. . . . Under most circumstances, it 
would be within state or local government power to restrict the use of certain aircraft, includ-
ing a UAS, by the state or local police . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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no express preemption clause.69 Therefore, whether state and local drone regu-
lations will survive a constitutional challenge will depend on whether Congress 
(or the FAA) has impliedly preempted UAS regulations. To do so, the federal 
government must evoke a “clear and manifest purpose” to preempt the state 
regulation in question.70  
States and municipalities may limit private drone flights near specific sen-
sitive areas, like backyards, crowds, or government buildings. And it is doubt-
ful that Congress or the FAA will express a “clear and manifest purpose” to 
preempt such laws. This is especially true because enforcement of such laws 
would be difficult if left exclusively to the federal government, and these laws 
protect interests particularly important to state and local governments (i.e., 
property, safety, and privacy). This issue is complex and is outside the scope of 
this note.  
 Multiple sources keep a decently up-to-date record of the progress of state 
UAS-related legislation. From these, we see that at least forty-five states have 
considered 168 bills related to drones, and twenty-six have enacted laws ad-
dressing UAS issues.71 
II. MODERN FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE RELEVANT TO 
WARRANTLESS UAS SURVEILLANCE 
The function of the Fourth Amendment appears on its face to secure a con-
stitutionally-protected domain of private activity, life, and property, that is en-
joyed exclusively by the People, to which the People have granted the govern-
ment only a limited right of access—when the government presents probable 
cause of criminal activity. By its terms, the Amendment ensures the “right of 
the People to be secure” in our “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” free from 
“unreasonable searches.”72 Warrantless “searches” are presumptively unreason-
able, so we are left with determining whether a warrantless government action 
constitutes a “search” for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Three inde-
pendent doctrines may brand a government action as a “search” for the purpos-
es of the Fourth Amendment: (A) the common-law physical trespass doctrine, 
(B) the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine, and (C) the technological 
trespass doctrine.  
                                                        
69  See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Express 
Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 2009). 
70  Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). 
71  Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 
25, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmanned-aircraft-state-law-
landscape.aspx (“So far, 26 states have enacted laws addressing UAS issues and an addition-
al six states have adopted resolutions.”); see also Allie Bohm, Status of 2014 Domestic 
Drone Legislation in the States, ACLU: FREE FUTURE (June 30, 2014), https://www.aclu.org 
/blog/technology-and-liberty/status-2014-domestic-drone-legislation-states. 
72  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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A. The Common-Law Physical Trespass Doctrine 
 In 2012, a plurality of the Supreme Court deemed an investigation uncon-
stitutional because the government physically intruded upon a person’s car.73 In 
United States v. Jones, Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, explained that a 
person’s “Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz [reasona-
ble expectation of privacy] formulation.”74 Justice Scalia explained that the 
common-law trespass test is now and always has been the foundational and 
primary doctrine of the Fourth Amendment.75 Applying the common-law tres-
pass test in Jones, the plurality found that “the Government’s installation of a 
GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehi-
cle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search,’ ” and thereby violated the Fourth 
Amendment.76 The next year, a majority of the Supreme Court expressly reaf-
firmed Jones and the viability of the common-law physical trespass doctrine.77 
 The Jones plurality distinguished United States v. Knotts, a 1983 case in 
which the Court held that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from 
one place to another.”78 Instead of abrogating Knotts and finding that Jones did 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy on the road, the Jones plurality held 
that the government’s physical intrusion on Jones’s car constituted a “search” 
within the “original meaning” of the Fourth Amendment.79 Jones revived a 
strict level of protection from physical trespasses onto “persons, houses, papers, 
and effects.”80 
B. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Doctrine 
In 1967, the Court expanded the protections of the Fourth Amendment.81 In 
Katz v. United States, the Court held that FBI agents conducted a “search” 
when they attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside 
of a public telephone booth and listened in on the petitioner’s private conversa-
tions, even though the government never physically trespassed on the suspect’s 
property.82 In contrast to the trespass-only approach to the Fourth Amendment, 
the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not plac-
                                                        
73  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–54 (2012). 
74  Id. at 950; see also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (quoting and affirm-
ing Jones). 
75  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952. 
76  Id. at 949 (footnote omitted). 
77  Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. 
78  United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983); see Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951–52. 
79  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 n.3. 
80  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See generally Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. 
81  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“We conclude that the underpin-
nings of [the trespass doctrine] have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that [it] can 
no longer be regarded as controlling.”). 
82  Id. at 348–53. 
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es,” concluding that the government’s wiretapping was a “search” for the pur-
poses of the Fourth Amendment.83 The Court reasoned that electronically lis-
tening to and recording a person’s conversations violates the privacy upon 
which the person “justifiably relie[s]” when using a telephone booth.84 “[W]hat 
he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was . . . the uninvited ear. He 
did not shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place 
where he might be seen.”85 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz explained that government activity is 
a search, for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, if it intrudes on a person’s 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”86 Later courts have adopted Justice Har-
lan’s approach in Katz: to have a reasonable expectation of privacy, a suspect 
must actually have a subjective “expectation of privacy[,] and… that expecta-
tion [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as [objectively] ‘rea-
sonable.’ ”87 
C. Limitations on the Common-Law Trespass and the Reasonable  
Expectation of Privacy Doctrines 
Some have criticized the Katz test for being circular, overly subjective, and 
lacking textual and historical foundation.88 In its practical application, it often 
fails to protect the privacy interests of individuals. This is true despite the 
Court’s assurance in Katz that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places,” and “what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area ac-
cessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”89 Similarly, some 
                                                        
83  Id. at 350–53. 
84  Id. at 353. 
85  Id. at 352. Therefore, one relevant consideration in a warrantless UAS surveillance case is 
if the suspect reasonably sought to exclude the uninvited eye from a low altitude aerial van-
tage point. A person seeks auditory seclusion when she enters a phone booth; she cannot rea-
sonably expect visible seclusion. Therefore, in Katz, the defendant did not shed his right to 
auditory privacy, even though he likely shed his right to visible privacy. See id. In a UAS 
surveillance case, the question of whether the suspect shed her right to visible privacy from 
aerial vantage point is going to be much less clear, and will probably depend on the precise 
location of the object of the search. 
86  Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
87  Id. The Supreme Court later expressly adopted Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz, clar-
ifying that the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine is a two-part inquiry. See Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1979); see also Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 
(2000); California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 320 (1987) (White, J., dissenting). 
88  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“The Katz test . . . has often been crit-
icized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.”); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 
83, 97–98 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In my view, the only thing the past three decades 
have established about the Katz test . . . is that, unsurprisingly, those ‘actual (subjective) ex-
pectation[s] of privacy’ ‘that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable,” ’. . . bear an 
uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.” 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
89  Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–52. 
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have criticized the common-law physical trespass test for being overly formula-
ic and unable to capture the realities of modern law enforcement techniques.90 
Three lines of cases that reveal the limitations of these doctrines will be of 
particular importance to a UAS surveillance case: (1) the open fields doctrine 
cases; (2) the aerial surveillance cases; and (3) the public exposure doctrine 
cases. 
1. Open Fields Doctrine 
 The Supreme Court first enunciated the open fields doctrine in Hester v. 
United States91 in 1924 under the common-law trespass doctrine, and later reaf-
firmed the doctrine in Oliver v. United States92 in 1984 under the Katz reasona-
ble expectation of privacy test. Pursuant to this case law, the act of entering and 
searching an “open field”—even when the open field is on private property—
does not constitute a “search,” without more, for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.93 Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court recognizes two types of 
real property: the home and its “curtilage,”94 wherein the government needs a 
warrant to enter and search, and all other real property, considered analogous to 
an “open field,” wherein the government may enter and search without a war-
rant.95 
 In United States v. Dunn, the Court enunciated a four-factor test to deter-
mine whether a defendant’s real property is part of the curtilage of the home or 
                                                        
90  See id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
In . . . Goldman v. United States, [we] had held that electronic surveillance accomplished with-
out the physical penetration of petitioner’s premises by a tangible object did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. [Goldman] should now be overruled. Its limitation on Fourth Amendment 
protection is, in the present day, bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of 
privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion. 
Id. (citation and footnote omitted). 
91  See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (“[T]he special protection accorded 
by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ is not 
extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the 
common law.”). 
92  See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176–77, 181 (1984). 
93  Id. at 181 (“[A]n individual has no legitimate expectation that open fields will remain free 
from warrantless intrusion by government officers.”). 
94  Simply put, the “curtilage” is usually the area immediately surrounding the home. Id. at 
180. 
95  Some contend that the Supreme Court undermined the logical foundation of Katz when it 
reaffirmed what we know as the “open fields doctrine” under the reasonable expectation of 
privacy context. See id. at 189–90 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has af-
forded protection in many places not specifically enumerated in the text of the Amendment, 
such as public telephone booths, and that “privacy interests are not coterminous with proper-
ty rights. However, because ‘property rights reflect society’s explicit recognition of a per-
son’s authority to act as he wishes in certain areas, [they] should be considered in determin-
ing whether an individual’s expectations of privacy are reasonable.’ ” (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153 (1978) (Powell, J., concur-
ring))). 
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part of the defendant’s unprotected property: (1) physical proximity to the 
home; (2) whether the area is inside an enclosure surrounding the home (i.e., a 
porch); (3) the defendant’s use of the area; and (4) the steps taken by the de-
fendant to preserve her privacy in this area.96 In Dunn, the Court found that a 
barn was not part of the respondent’s curtilage because it was sixty yards from 
the house, outside of the fence surrounding the house, and the officers had good 
information that the barn was not being used as part of the respondent’s 
home.97 Additionally, the Court considered the fact that the respondent had 
done little to protect the barn area from observation by those standing outside.98 
The open fields doctrine affects the common-law trespass doctrine and the 
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine differently, and this distinction may 
have an impact on future UAS surveillance cases. In applying the open fields 
doctrine to the common-law physical trespass test, the Court will examine the 
physical location of the government agents—or perhaps the location of the 
government’s surveillance equipment (i.e., drones)—during the alleged search. 
Under this test, the government does not engage in a “search” by trespassing 
into an open field. In applying the open fields doctrine to the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy test, the Court will examine the physical location of the object 
of the search (i.e., the evidence) during the challenged investigation.99 Under 
this test, the government does not engage in a “search” simply by observing ev-
idence found within an open field. 
In Oliver v. United States, the Court applied the open fields doctrine to the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test. Police officers did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment when they trespassed in a privately owned “open field” for several 
hours without a warrant.100 The officers eventually found a patch of marijuana 
plants in a private field over one mile from the petitioner’s home, which was 
otherwise obstructed from view. The lower court found that the petitioner “had 
done all that could be expected of him to assert his privacy in the area of farm 
that was searched.”101 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that “an individual 
may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in 
fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home.”102 The court thus 
                                                        
96  United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). 
97  Id. at 301–02. 
98  Id. at 303. See also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173–75. 
99  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012). 
100  See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173–75. 
101  Id. at 173. However, the Supreme Court must not have been satisfied with this lower 
court finding because it said that fences and “No Trespassing” signs do not effectively bar 
open fields from public view (even though the police had to go several hundred feet to dis-
cover the marijuana, and there was no allegation that the police, in this case, could see the 
marijuana without trespassing). See id. at 179. The Court considered this alleged public visi-
bility central to its holding. See id. No doubt, the distinction the Court attempted to draw 
here was between the assertion of your intention to keep your property private (or, as some 
would say, invoking your right to privacy), and actually doing all you can to keep your prop-
erty private (for example, encapsulating your property in a windowless, steel dome). 
102  Id. at 178. 
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analyzed the location of the evidence at issue, not the location of the govern-
ment agents. 
2. Aerial Surveillance Cases 
 The Supreme Court’s seminal aerial surveillance cases held that the gov-
ernment did not engage in a Fourth Amendment “search” when it engaged in 
warrantless aerial surveillance.103 The Court applied the Katz reasonable expec-
tation of privacy doctrine in each of these cases and declared it unreasonable to 
expect privacy from a manned aircraft operating at a lawful aerial vantage 
point. The Court did not apply the Kyllo technological trespass doctrine in any 
of these cases, which might have altered the result. 
 In California v. Ciraolo, the government flew over the respondent’s house 
at an altitude of 1,000 feet in order to inspect the respondent’s backyard, which 
was shielded from view at ground level.104 The officers, trained in marijuana 
identification, spotted marijuana plants growing in the backyard.105 The Court 
found that the backyard was part of the respondent’s curtilage, and that the re-
spondent manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in his backyard.106 
This left the Court to determine whether society was willing to recognize that 
expectation as reasonable, which it answered in the negative.107 In making this 
determination, the Court relied on several important factors: the observation 
was made from a lawful public vantage point within publically navigable air-
space, the observations were conducted “in a physically nonintrusive manner,” 
and the observations were made by the naked eye.108 
 On the same day as Ciraolo, the Supreme Court handed down another im-
portant warrantless aerial surveillance decision: Dow Chemical Co. v. United 
States.109 In Dow Chemical, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) op-
erated a fixed-wing aircraft at the altitudes of 12,000; 3,000; and 1,200 feet, 
and utilized a high-resolution aerial mapping camera to investigate and photo-
                                                        
103  See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); 
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
104  Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209. 
105  Id. 
106  Id. at 212–14. 
107  Id. The Court concluded that observations of the curtilage, made from lawful vantage 
points, are permissible under the Fourth Amendment: 
The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law en-
forcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor 
does the mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities 
preclude an officer’s observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and 
which renders the activities clearly visible. 
Id. at 213. 
108  Id. 
109  Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 228 (1986). 
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graph a chemical company’s industrial complex.110 Dow Chemical Company 
(“Dow”) operated a 2,000-acre chemical plant consisting of “numerous covered 
buildings, with manufacturing equipment and piping conduits located between 
the various buildings exposed to visual observations from the air.”111 Dow took 
extensive steps to assert its interest in maintaining its privacy and obscure 
ground-level public view of the facility:  
At all times, Dow has maintained elaborate security around the perimeter of the 
complex barring ground-level public views of these areas. . . . Dow has not un-
dertaken, however, to conceal all manufacturing equipment within the complex 
from aerial views. Dow maintains that the cost of covering its exposed equip-
ment would be prohibitive.112 
 The Court found the surveillance constitutional, holding that the common-
law curtilage doctrine therefore does not apply to a large industrial complex of 
closed buildings.113 Unlike Ciraolo, the government in Dow Chemical conduct-
ed aerial surveillance of a constitutionally unprotected area, and therefore Dow 
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the industrial plant. 
 The district court in Dow Chemical found that the government’s surveil-
lance camera was “the finest precision aerial camera available,” which allowed 
the EPA to capture “a great deal more than the human eye could ever see.”114 
However, the camera’s precision was not relevant to the Supreme Court’s anal-
ysis, because the object of the search was not in the suspect’s curtilage and the 
aircraft was in lawful public airspace.115 Therefore, Ciraolo and Dow Chemical 
teach that the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine does not prevent the 
government, operating at a “lawful” vantage point, from making naked-eye aer-
ial observations of the curtilage or high-resolution camera observations of non-
curtilage property. 
 In Florida v. Riley, the Court once again found a warrantless aerial surveil-
lance not to be a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.116 Like Ciraolo, the 
officers could not observe the suspected marijuana crop from ground level.117 
The police flew a helicopter twice over the respondent’s property only 400 feet 
above the ground, making naked-eye observations of the marijuana through 
openings in a greenhouse roof and its open sides.118 
A plurality of the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require 
the police, traveling in public airways at an altitude of 400 feet, to obtain a war-
                                                        
110  The Court described this camera as a “standard floor-mounted, precision aerial mapping 
camera.” Id. at 229. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. 
113  See id. at 239. 
114  Id. at 230. 
115  See id. at 239. 
116  Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989). 
117  See id. 
118  See id. at 448. 
16 NEV. L.J. 373 SPELMAN - FINAL.DOCX 1/15/16  9:47 PM 
Fall 2015] UPDATING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 393 
rant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.119 The plurality rea-
soned that the respondent should not have left the greenhouse’s sides and roof 
partially open, revealing its interior to helicopter flights in lawful airspace.120 
Based on the plurality’s approach, we do not know what steps a person must 
take to protect her reasonable expectations of privacy.121 The plurality in Riley 
further reasoned that “there [was] nothing in the record . . . to suggest that heli-
copters flying at 400 feet” were so rare that the respondent’s expectations of 
privacy were, in fact, reasonable.122 Additionally, there was no evidence that 
the helicopter interfered with respondent’s normal use of his greenhouse, or 
other parts of his curtilage, as well as no evidence that the police observed “in-
timate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage . . . [or created] 
undue noise . . . wind, dust, or threat of injury.”123 
 A critical, undecided issue from Riley is whether the lawfulness of the 
flight alone is enough to validate naked-eye surveillance, or whether the gov-
ernment flight must have occurred in a place in which the public travels at 
some minimum frequency. A majority of the Court in Riley (Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence and four dissenters) held instead that the proper in-
quiry is not whether the police flew the aircraft where aircraft lawfully could 
be—unless a defendant can demonstrate that flights were sufficiently rare—but 
                                                        
119  Id. at 450. 
120  Id. Respondents suggested that police should be required to obtain a warrant for flights 
below 500 feet, because that is the lowest lawful altitude for fixed-wing aircraft operating in 
navigable airspace, according to Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) regulations. 
The Court rejected this suggestion, however, because FAA regulations permit helicopters to 
fly below that limit. The helicopter did not violate FAA regulations, and therefore any mem-
ber of the public or the police could legally have observed the respondent’s greenhouse from 
that altitude. Id. at 450–51, 451 n.3. 
121  “To require individuals to completely cover and enclose their curtilage is to demand 
more than the ‘precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy.’ ” Id. at 454 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152 (1978) (Powell, J., 
concurring)). See also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152 (“In considering the reasonableness of asserted 
privacy expectations, the Court has recognized that no single factor invariably will be deter-
minative. Thus, the Court has examined whether a person invoking the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment took normal precautions to maintain his privacy—that is, precautions 
customarily taken by those seeking privacy.”). 
122  Riley, 488 U.S. at 451. 
123  Id. at 452. In contrast, the Court in Kyllo held that the Court should not inquire into the 
quality and nature of the activities observed within the curtilage, because this would require 
the Court to make policy judgments about what details are intimate, and what are not. Kyllo 
v. United States, 533 U.S. 26, 37–38 (2001) (“The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the 
home has never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained. 
. . . In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is 
held safe from prying government eyes. . . . Limiting the prohibition of thermal imaging to 
‘intimate details’ would not only be wrong in principle; it would be impractical in applica-
tion . . . .”). The Court in Kyllo may have intended to expressly repudiate the “intimate de-
tails” analysis from Riley. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Personal Curtilage: Fourth 
Amendment Security in Public, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1283, 1335 (2014) (“Kyllo, in fact, 
seemed to challenge the entire construct of intimate details, calling into question the reason-
ing in Florida v. Riley.”). 
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whether the aircraft is somewhere where one might expect it to be with suffi-
cient regularity.124 Justice Blackmun indicated that he would burden the gov-
ernment with proving that flights are sufficiently regular as to remove a reason-
able expectation of privacy.125 Justice O’Connor appeared to leave the burden 
on the defendant to prove that the aircraft did not meet the “sufficient regulari-
ty” test.126 This issue will become a central question in unmanned aerial sur-
veillance cases. 
 The Court has not since clarified whether the “sufficient regularity” test is 
controlling or if law enforcement and lower courts need only consider whether 
the flight is in publically navigable airspace. And even though a majority of the 
Court agreed upon the “sufficient regularity” test, there was no consensus as to 
where the burden of persuasion should rest for this issue. Furthermore, the 
Court left little guidance on how frequent the flights must be in order to satisfy 
this test. So it remains to be seen whether the Court would apply this test to a 
UAS surveillance case, and how it would do so. 
 Also, if the Court does adopt this test, it is unclear whether it would wholly 
replace the “lawful airspace” test. In other words, will a surveillance flight 
comply with the Fourth Amendment if it violates FAA regulations or state pri-
vacy law, but nonetheless occurs in airspace frequented by the public with “suf-
ficient regularity”?127 Moreover, what if the government uses UAS in a lawful, 
popular area but in an uncommon manner?128 Current case law gives no clear 
answer. 
                                                        
124  Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 454 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“In determining 
whether Riley had a reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial observation, the relevant 
inquiry after Ciraolo is not whether the helicopter was where it had a right to be under FAA 
regulations. Rather, consistent with Katz, we must ask whether the helicopter was in the pub-
lic airways at an altitude at which members of the public travel with sufficient regularity that 
Riley’s expectation of privacy from aerial observation was not ‘one that society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable.’ ”); id. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The question before us 
must be . . . whether public observation of Riley’s curtilage was so commonplace that Ri-
ley’s expectation of privacy in his backyard could not be considered reasonable.”); id. at 
467–68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (pointing out that a majority of the Court agrees that the 
lawfulness of the flight (i.e., compliance with FAA regulations) is irrelevant for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, and that he would place the burden of proof on the government to 
disprove the presumption that any helicopter flying below 1,000 feet is rare). 
125  Id. at 468 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
126  See id. at 454, 455 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (determining that there was nothing in the 
record to suggest that the helicopter was in airspace not frequented by other helicopters or 
aircraft—apparently expecting the petitioner to demonstrate that the airspace in question was 
usually plane-free). 
127  In other words, if regulatory efforts to control private drone flights fail, will the police 
nonetheless need to comply with the unenforced drone regulations in order to comply with 
the Fourth Amendment? 
128  For example, can the government engage in drone surveillance in airspace frequented by 
the public but for surveillance if the public does not commonly utilize drones in that area for 
video recording or photography? 
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 Finally, what types of laws dictate whether certain airspace is “publically 
navigable” or “lawful”? If the “sufficient regularity” test does not hold sway, 
the only relevant inquiry will be whether the flight was “lawful”—i.e., whether 
the flight was in publicly “navigable airspace.”129 The Supreme Court and 
many states recognize a property interest in the airspace above our properties, 
usually up to about 500 feet.130 In some states, such as Nevada, these airspace 
rights are “subject to intrusion by lawful air flight.”131 For states without this 
limitation, flights through someone’s private airspace are likely violations of 
the state law tort of trespass. This may be enough for the Court to find that the 
flight was unlawful and therefore a violation of our reasonable expectations of 
privacy. However, the FAA maintains a potentially conflicting132 claim of pow-
er to regulate all airspace “from the ground up.”133 Perhaps the only relevant 
laws to the “publically navigable airspace” calculation are FAA regulations. It 
remains to be seen whether the flight must merely be “lawful” or if it must oc-
cur in airspace frequented by the public with “sufficient regularity.” Both of 
these tests require further clarification. 
 In contrast with the aerial surveillance cases, the Court found in Kyllo v. 
United States that the government violated the Fourth Amendment when it 
peered, from a public place, into otherwise unobservable curtilage by means of 
technology that was “not in general public use” at the time.134 This technology 
was a thermal imaging device used to gain evidence of suspected marijuana 
growth within a home; the device detected the increased temperatures within 
the structure often associated with marijuana growing lights.135 In both the aeri-
al surveillance cases and Kyllo, the government utilized technology to see in-
side the home or curtilage, because it could not otherwise view inside without 
physically trespassing. 
Professor Morgan Cloud observed the apparent paradox that arises between 
the aerial surveillance cases and Kyllo:  
Flying a helicopter or an airplane at low altitudes so police officers can see into 
parts of a home or its curtilage that would otherwise be hidden from public view 
                                                        
129  The “lawfulness” of a flight will be the exclusive inquiry unless the claimant can prove 
that the flight was “sufficiently rare in this country to lend substance to [the suspect’s] claim 
that he reasonably anticipated that his greenhouse would not be subject to observation from 
that altitude.” Riley, 488 U.S. at 451–52 (considering FAA regulations on helicopter flight 
controlling). 
130  See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 263–64 (1946). 
131  McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110, 1120 (Nev. 2006) (“Thus, the land-
owners own the usable airspace above their property up to 500 feet, subject to intrusion by 
lawful air flight.”). 
132  Consider the Court’s conclusion in Causby that we are to have “exclusive control” of the 
airspace within the “immediate reaches” of the ground. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 264. 
133  Busting Myths, supra note 60 (“The FAA is responsible for air safety from the ground 
up. . . . [T]he FAA presently has regulations that apply to the operation of all aircraft, wheth-
er manned or unmanned, and irrespective of the altitude at which the aircraft is operating.”). 
134  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
135  Id. at 29–30. 
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is not a search. But using a commercially available machine that only measures 
the heat emitted from the same house is a Fourth Amendment search.136 
The most important explanation for this disparity is that the Supreme Court re-
lied on the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test for the aerial surveil-
lance cases, but relied on an expansion of the common-law trespass doctrine for 
Kyllo. Another possibly relevant distinction between these cases is that the po-
lice utilized a unique means of observation in Kyllo, but simply utilized a 
unique vantage point in the aerial surveillance cases. In a UAS case, the gov-
ernment will do both. 
 Based on the aerial surveillance cases, the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy doctrine appears to allow the government, without a warrant, to fly air-
craft in areas accessible to the public in order to make naked-eye observations 
of the curtilage and high-resolution observations of open fields; the govern-
ment, however, might be restricted to flying only in airspace in which the pub-
lic flies with “sufficient regularity.” Nonetheless, it is quite unclear, based on 
these cases, what the Fourth Amendment allows regarding unmanned aircraft, 
which cannot make naked-eye observations, which normally fly at much lower 
altitudes than manned aircraft, which achieve much more revealing vantage 
points into windows and other parts of the curtilage, and which will soon be 
much more common than helicopters or airplanes in low-altitude airspace (ab-
sent sufficiently enforced legislation). 
3. The Public Exposure Doctrine 
 Generally, the government does not engage in an unreasonable “search” 
when it inspects something that a suspect “knowingly” exposes to the public. In 
Katz, the Court declared, “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion.”137 In Smith v. Maryland, the police did not engage in a “search” when 
they installed a “pen register” to record the phone numbers that a suspect di-
aled, which led to incriminating evidence.138 Even though the suspect exhibited 
a subjective expectation of privacy in these numbers, the Court held that such 
an expectation was not one that society would deem reasonable. 
 Similarly, in United States v. Knotts, the Court held that one does not have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy on a public road.139 The Supreme Court 
                                                        
136  Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court, Technology 
and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 7–8 (2002) (footnotes omitted). 
137  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). The Supreme Court relied on this quote 
from Katz, in part, in California v. Ciraolo, one of the aerial surveillance cases. See Califor-
nia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986) (quoting Katz and finding that marijuana growth 
in a suspect’s backyard was “knowingly exposed” to members of the public traversing the 
sky). 
138  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (“[P]etitioner assumed the risk that the 
company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”). 
139  United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
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found that the surveillance in this case amounted principally to “the following 
of an automobile on public streets and highways.”140 In relevant part, the Court 
held that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. 
When [the suspect] traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed” the 
details of his travels.141 
 The Supreme Court in California v. Ciraolo and Florida v. Riley (the aerial 
surveillance cases) could have relied on this “public exposure” doctrine: the 
suspects in those cases “knowingly exposed” contents in their curtilage to 
members of the public flying at lawful aerial vantage points.142 After all, the 
Court has analogized airspace to a public highway.143 But in Knotts, the de-
fendants themselves were personally present on the public highways. In the aer-
ial surveillance cases, only the government was on the “public highway”—the 
evidence was located in constitutionally protected areas. What Knotts, Ciraolo, 
and Riley have in common is that the government found incriminating evidence 
located in places somewhat exposed to observation from a public vantage point. 
In sum, it is unclear whether the public exposure doctrine would apply to ob-
servations of the interior of the home or curtilage by a low-flying, nearby 
drone. 
D. The Technological Trespass Doctrine 
 The most important precedent for a warrantless UAS surveillance case, 
even more so than the aerial surveillance cases, may be Kyllo v. United 
States.144 Kyllo is an expansion of the definition of “trespass” under the com-
mon-law trespass doctrine of the Fourth Amendment: even if a government 
agent does not enter into a constitutionally protected area with her physical per-
son, she nonetheless engages in an unconstitutional trespass where she, without 
a warrant, “obtain[s] by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding 
the home’s interior that could not otherwise have been obtained without physi-
cal ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ . . . at least where . . . the 
                                                        
140  Id. Then the Court cited its previous holding that one has a “lesser” expectation of priva-
cy in a motor vehicle,  
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation 
and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little 
capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants 
and its contents are in plain view. 
Id. (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)). 
141  Id. (emphasis added). 
142  See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–50 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 
213–14 (1986). 
143  See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946). 
144  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 26 (2001). 
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technology in question is not in general public use.”145 The Court in Kyllo de-
clared,  
It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens 
by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of tech-
nology. For example, . . . the technology enabling human flight has exposed to 
public view (and hence, we have said, to official observation) uncovered por-
tions of the house and its curtilage that once were private. The question we con-
front today is what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the 
realm of guaranteed privacy.146 
The Court in Kyllo thus sought to create a Fourth Amendment doctrine bet-
ter suited to address emerging surveillance technologies. In Kyllo, federal 
agents observed the interior of a home with a thermal-imaging device that was 
not in general public use.147 The federal agents observed the home from across 
the street (a public vantage point), and observed that part of the home was sub-
stantially warmer than neighboring homes.148 From this information, and other 
evidence, the agents obtained a warrant and discovered an indoor marijuana 
growing operation.149 The Court held that this was an unconstitutional search: 
“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, 
to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable 
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant.”150 
 The Court explained, “ ‘At the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands 
the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unrea-
sonable governmental intrusion.’ With few exceptions, the question whether a 
warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be an-
swered no.”151 The Court then explored the difference between its new holding 
in Kyllo and the common-law physical trespass doctrine. The Court admitted 
that under the common law, “[v]isual surveillance was unquestionably lawful 
because ‘the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass.’ ”152 
However, the Court determined that an expansion of the common-law trespass 
doctrine was both proper and necessary in light of new surveillance technology. 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, also explored the weakness of the Katz 
reasonable expectation of privacy test in protecting against new police surveil-
lance techniques.153 The Court pointed out that “[t]he Katz test . . . has often 
                                                        
145  See id. at 28 (citation omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 
(1961)). 
146  Id. at 33–34 (citation omitted). 
147  Id. at 29–30, 40. 
148  Id. at 30. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. at 40. 
151  Id. at 31 (citations omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 
(1961)). 
152  Id. at 31–32 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886)). 
153  See id. at 34. 
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been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.”154 Fur-
thermore, the Court observed that it had previously “applied [Katz] to hold that 
a Fourth Amendment search does not occur—even when the explicitly protect-
ed location of a house is concerned,” referencing two of the aerial surveillance 
cases.155 The Kyllo majority apparently believed that its new technological tres-
pass doctrine would be better suited to stop the diminution of privacy rights by 
technology. 
Surely, the technological trespass doctrine takes at least a small step to 
prevent the age of advancing technology from erasing our currently enjoyed 
protections under the Fourth Amendment. However, the “not in general public 
use” dicta from Kyllo remains an important limitation of this doctrine, and may 
reduce the effectiveness of this test to protect privacy rights from technologies 
that have diffused into the public sphere.156 Many electronic surveillance tech-
nologies, like drones, may soon be in “general public use,” if they are not al-
ready. Thus, this limitation may expose the Kyllo technological trespass doc-
trine to the exact same trouble as the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy 
test, diminishing its protections when technologies become popular.157 But even 
if the Supreme Court adopts the “not in general public use”158 limitation in cas-
es going forward, litigants might still convince the Supreme Court that the gov-
                                                        
154  Id. 
155  Id. at 33 (first citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); and then citing 
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989)). 
156  See Villasenor, supra note 33, at 487–89 (concluding that a “not in general public use 
test” will diminish our privacy upon the proliferation of UAS platforms). On the other hand, 
some would argue, as would I, that it is still possible, under Kyllo, that the Court could ex-
tend the technological trespass doctrine to proscribe some technology that is in general pub-
lic use, especially because such a case was not before the Court in Kyllo. See id. at 488 
(“[T]o conclude from Kyllo that use of a widely available technology to examine a home will 
necessarily be constitutional is not an entirely fair reading of Justice Scalia’s opinion.”). 
157  Justice Stevens, dissenting in Kyllo, argued that the Court’s new standard in Kyllo would 
diminish privacy protection as “intrusive equipment becomes more readily available.” See 
Kyllo, 533 U.S at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Of course, this is the exact same trouble that 
the Katz test will suffer, because one’s expectations of privacy are certainly less reasonable 
when a particular means of surveillance becomes increasingly common in the private sector. 
In Florida v. Riley, a majority of the Court held that a surveillance flight in lawful airspace 
would nonetheless be a “search” unless the aircraft flew in an area in which the public oper-
ates with “sufficient regularity.” See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 454 (1989) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring); id. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting, with whom Marshall, J., and Stevens, J., 
join); id. at 467–68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
158  The Court in Kyllo did not expressly declare how it would rule on a future case in which 
the technology in question was in general public use—to do so would have been dicta be-
cause such a case was not before the Court. However, the Court did self-limit its holding in 
Kyllo to the situation in which the technology is not in general public use. See Kyllo, 533 
U.S. at 34. 
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ernment’s specific use of the technology is nonetheless a technological trespass 
when the government uses it in a manner uncommon of the public.159  
In sum, under the Kyllo technological trespass doctrine, the government 
“trespasses” into the curtilage of a home, thus engaging in a “search,” when it 
utilizes sense-enhancing technology—even from a public vantage point—to 
gain information about the interior of the home that would otherwise only be 
attainable via a physical intrusion (at least where the technology is not in gen-
eral public use). Defendants subject to warrantless UAS surveillance of their 
homes might successfully argue that the surveillance is an unconstitutional 
search under the Kyllo technological trespass doctrine, discussed infra in Part 
III, Section C. 
III. APPLICATION OF MODERN FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE  
TO WARRANTLESS UAS SURVEILLANCE 
In the coming years, it is likely that courts will be asked to decide the con-
stitutionality of warrantless UAS surveillance of the home or curtilage. In the 
typical scenario, the UAS might wield a high-resolution camera, or instead a 
lower-resolution camera that mimics 20/20 naked-eye capabilities. The situa-
tion I explore below is one in which the drone flies at a relatively low altitude 
compared to the lawful flight capabilities of manned aircraft—say approxi-
mately 100 feet from the ground. The drone will be able to achieve unique van-
tage points previously impractical or unattainable by ground or manned flight 
observations. The drone might even fly directly above the suspect’s yard or 
home. Perhaps the drone will fly as low as eye-level over the suspect’s proper-
ty, or from public airspace above the street or a park.  
Some drones may have the capability to remain aloft for extended periods 
of time, revealing a different set of information that short-term or momentary 
aerial observation could not reveal (i.e., daily or weekly routine information). 
Some drones will be loud, large, and quite conspicuous, but others will be en-
tirely inconspicuous to the untrained eye, no larger than a hummingbird or 
bee.160 On some drones, the government might equip advanced imaging tech-
nology, such as thermal imaging.161  
                                                        
159  For example, if state and local legislatures ban the public from spying on one another 
with drones, and effectively enforce these laws, there is little reason to hold that the Fourth 
Amendment allows the government to engage in such conduct without a warrant. 
160  See discussion supra Part I.A. 
161  In addition to imaging technology, it is theoretically possible for the police to equip “la-
ser microphone[s]” onto drones, which allow users to pick up audio occurring within a 
home. See Arthur, supra note 35. However, the Supreme Court warned in Dow Chemical 
that such technology would raise serious constitutional questions, “An electronic device to 
penetrate walls or windows so as to hear and record confidential discussions of chemical 
formulae or other trade secrets would raise very different and far more serious questions.” 
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986). 
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Both manned aircraft surveillance and drone surveillance occur from up in 
the sky, but the similarities between these surveillance techniques end there. 
Drones can fly lower, closer, and quieter—offering investigators unique van-
tage points into the home and curtilage. Further, drones are significantly cheap-
er than helicopters and airplanes, and will soon be able to remain aloft for much 
longer. For these reasons, drones present an unprecedented challenge to indi-
vidual privacy. 
A. The Jones Physical Trespass Analysis 
The Jones common-law physical trespass test will probably not invalidate a 
UAS surveillance, unless the government flies the drone at very low altitude, 
such as within and below the backyard walls (i.e., below ten feet) or just a few 
feet from a home window.162 Although we do have property rights several hun-
dred feet above our homes,163 the airspace above a certain height and beyond a 
very short distance from the house will almost certainly not receive Fourth 
Amendment protection. Whether a drone entered constitutionally protected air-
space will depend on whether it is part of the “curtilage” of the home, which 
the Court determines by applying the four Dunn factors: (1) the physical prox-
imity of the area to the home; (2) whether the area is inside an enclosure sur-
rounding the home; (3) the property-owner’s use of this area; and (4) the steps 
the property-owner has taken to preserve her privacy in this area.164 Therefore, 
the physical trespass analysis is wholly irrelevant unless the drone flies within 
the curtilage.165 Also, if the drone trespasses in the airspace owned by a third 
                                                        
162  As discussed above in Part I.A, there are drones currently in development that will be the 
size of a hummingbird, and some even the size of bees. See Ravindran, supra note 29; The 
Surveillance Hummingbird, supra note 27. Whether by the Jones doctrine or Katz, the police 
might violate the Fourth Amendment simply by flying a drone into the very-low altitude (a 
few feet) airspace directly above our house and other areas of the curtilage. See United States 
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (“We have said that the airspace is a public highway. 
Yet it is obvious that if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have 
exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.”); Villasenor, su-
pra note 33, at 491 (noting that based on Causby, “it could be argued that a warrantless gov-
ernment-operated UAS that dips into a backyard at eye level to obtain photographs into the 
house through a back window would be operating outside of public navigable airspace, and 
that the images it acquired would be unconstitutional for that reason (among others).”). 
163  Causby, 328 U.S. at 264–65; McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110, 1120 
(Nev. 2006). 
164  Dunn concerned a barn that was sixty yards from the suspect’s house, and the Court de-
termined that it was not part of the “curtilage” of the home. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 
294, 301–02 (1987). 
165  Causby, 328 U.S. at 260–61, 264 (declaring the “ancient doctrine” at common law, that 
one’s ownership of his land extended to the periphery of the universe, has no place in the 
modern world, but instead held that “[t]he landowner owns at least as much of the space 
above the ground as the [sic] can occupy or use in connection with the land.”). Due to the 
quality of cameras that are easily attachable to drones, there is no reason to presume the 
drone must fly directly over our backyards or homes—they might fly from over the street or 
a nearby park. 
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party, the defendant would not be able to exclude this evidence even if the air-
space was part of the third party’s “curtilage.”166 Therefore, for a UAS surveil-
lance case, the central question under the common-law physical trespass analy-
sis will be whether the airspace in which the drone flies is part of the home’s 
“curtilage.”167 
1. Above Roof-Level Flight 
First, let us consider the airspace directly above the house and backyard, 
and above the altitude of the roof of the house, up to 100 feet. Because the 
property in question in Dunn was over sixty yards from the house, Dunn might 
stand for the proposition that sixty yards from the house is too far.168 But Dunn 
teaches that the distance from the house is only one factor among many.169 One 
hundred yards is probably too far to be within the curtilage, but the airspace 
immediately above the roof may be close enough to satisfy the “physical prox-
imity” Dunn factor. Nonetheless, this airspace is not part of the curtilage be-
cause it does not satisfy the other three Dunn factors. First, the airspace higher 
than a house is not within an enclosure surrounding the home. Second, people 
do not use this private airspace for the sort of intimate things as they would the 
interior of a home. Private airspace may have some reasonable private uses, but 
these uses are akin to those of an open field—best for hobby or consumer pur-
poses. People do not use their airspace for the intimate activities normally asso-
ciated with the “curtilage” of the home.170  
Finally, it would be interesting to see how anyone could take steps to pre-
serve the privacy of their private airspace, unless they erected 500-foot tall nets 
or fences to prevent drones from trespassing.171 For all of these reasons, the air-
                                                        
166  See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (“The text of the Amendment suggests 
that its protections extend only to people in ‘their’ houses.”). 
167  See Sean M. Kilbane, Note, Drones and Jones: Rethinking Curtilage Flyover in Light of 
the Revived Fourth Amendment Trespass Doctrine, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 249, 280 (2014) (“In 
aerial surveillance cases, the ultimate decision as to whether vertical curtilage of the home 
receives such protection depends on if the Supreme Court declares vertical curtilage of the 
home to be a constitutionally protected area.”). This author uses the term “vertical curtilage” 
to describe the airspace above our homes for which we have property rights. I do not agree 
with the use of the term “vertical curtilage,” which seems to conclude that the airspace above 
our homes is part of the curtilage—an assumption that is probably wrong. 
168  See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302. 
169  See id. at 301–03. 
170  Additionally, like an open field, the Court will not find private airspace to be an “effect,” 
which is currently limited to tangible personal property (i.e., chattels). See Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984) (finding that open fields are not “effects”). 
171  Boeing just developed a laser weapon designed to incinerate drones. See Silent Strike: 
Boeing’s Compact Laser Weapons System Tracks and Disables UAVs, BOEING (Aug. 27, 
2015) http://www.boeing.com/features/2015/08/bds-compact-laser-08-15.page. Also, a com-
pany named “DroneShield” provided an electronic means of drone enforcement—or at least 
drone detection. See Shawn Musgrave, Boston Police Set Up ‘Drone Shields’ Along the 2015 
Marathon Route, MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 22, 2015, 12:20 PM), motherboard.vice.com/read 
/boston-police-set-up-drone-shields-along-the-2015-marathon-route. DroneShield set up 
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space above our homes is not part of its “curtilage.” Therefore, the government 
does not engage in a “search” just because it trespasses into one’s private air-
space higher than the roof of her house. Even though this very well may consti-
tute a trespass at common law, it does not result in a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment under the physical trespass analysis. 
Notwithstanding, some scholars argue that the Jones common-law trespass 
doctrine will play a critical role in a UAS surveillance case.172 One commenta-
tor concluded that the Supreme Court might invoke the Jones physical trespass 
test to invalidate government UAS surveillance, believing the airspace above 
the landowner’s property to be “vertical curtilage.”173 However, the “open 
fields doctrine” precludes this conclusion174 in the airspace above the height of 
the roof of our homes.175 However, the airspace below the roof, and within the 
perimeter of our property walls, might be part of the home’s “curtilage.” 
                                                                                                                                 
sensing devices around the Boston Marathon course to attempt to detect any drones flying in 
the area. Id. DroneShield also offers law enforcement net guns, which are essentially shot-
guns that shoot nets into the air for the purpose of taking down a drone. See id. Or, venturing 
near the world of science fiction, perhaps one could disable a drone by some form of elec-
tromagnetic pulse that disables electronics. See Nic Halverson, Drone Missile Kills Electron-
ics, Not People, DISCOVERY NEWS, (Oct. 26, 2012, 1:04 PM), http://news.discovery.com/tech 
/champ-drone-emp-121026.htm (discussing a weapon Boeing is working on that disables 
electronics by firing a burst of high power microwaves). 
172  See Villasenor, supra note 33, at 495–97. For an excellent overview of Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine and how Jones may apply to a drone surveillance case, see Kilbane, supra 
note 167, at 280–81 (concluding that the Court will invoke the Jones doctrine to hold police 
drone surveillance unconstitutional because a drone fly-over is a trespass upon a homeown-
er’s airspace property rights). 
173  See Kilbane, supra note 167, at 280–81 (concluding that the Court must find the “verti-
cal curtilage” of the home to be a constitutionally protected area due to Jones and the Fourth 
Amendment’s historical context). 
174  All property rights grant “exclusive control” of the land or property to the property own-
er, but the idea of “exclusive control” is not paramount to having a Fourth Amendment right 
in the property, which we only enjoy in our “persons, houses, papers, and effects” and those 
things logically derived from that list. 
175  “Quite simply, an open field, unlike the curtilage of a home is not one of those protected 
areas enumerated in the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 
(2012) (citation omitted). Despite the fact that Jones revived strict protection of our home 
and curtilage, persons, papers, and effects, we are still left with no constitutional protection 
against government trespass on our non-curtilage real property. In Jones, Justice Scalia as-
sured us of the continuing vitality of the “open fields doctrine” under the common-law tres-
pass doctrine by distinguishing the strict protection for “effects” by the Fourth Amendment 
from the Amendment’s failure to protect our non-curtilage real property:  
[T]he Fourth Amendment is [not] concerned with “any technical trespass that led to the gather-
ing of evidence.” The Fourth Amendment protects against trespassory searches only with regard 
to those items (“persons, houses, papers, and effects”) that it enumerates. The trespass that oc-
curred in Oliver may properly be understood as a “search,” but not one “in the constitutional 
sense.” 
Id. at 953 n.8. 
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2. Eye-Level Altitude Flights 
The Dunn factors most favor constitutional protection of the extremely low 
airspace above private property, such as the airspace at eye level in the back-
yard (or within a few feet of someone’s home window). This airspace is proba-
bly part of the curtilage of the home. First, this airspace is in close proximity to 
the home. Second, the lower the flight, the more likely the airspace is within an 
enclosure surrounding the home (especially if flying below the level of the wall 
in the backyard, or at least below any trees in the backyard). Third, property 
owners certainly use the low-altitude airspace in their yards for intimate private 
purposes—it is where they walk through their backyard curtilage, erect struc-
tures, and simply enjoy the fresh air in the privacy of their property. 
However, it is hard to predict how a landowner might take steps to preserve 
the privacy of this airspace.176 But inquiring into whether the homeowner took 
steps to preserve the privacy of the airspace itself should be irrelevant for the 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and shows one of the weaknesses of the 
common-law physical trespass test. Rather than preserving the privacy of the 
airspace itself, the homeowner will almost certainly have taken steps to pre-
serve the privacy of that which is viewable from that airspace and below. But 
under the common-law physical trespass test, the only relevant question is the 
location of the government’s drone, not the subject of the search.177 Nonethe-
less, the sum total of the factors—and common sense—dictates that a drone 
hovering at about eye level in one’s backyard is within the curtilage. 
3. Mid-Altitude Flights (Above Eye-Level, Below Roof-Level) 
Whether the airspace directly above private property, below the altitude of 
the house’s roof, and above the backyard walls (somewhere between ten and 
thirty feet above the ground) is a constitutionally protected area is quite un-
clear. This is a constitutional shade of gray, but the answer is probably no. Al-
though the airspace is quite close to the home, it is a stretch to say it is “within” 
an enclosure surrounding the home. The airspace is closer to the home than that 
which is above the roof of the house, which weighs in favor of constitutional 
protection. But it is hard to imagine how a homeowner can take steps to pre-
serve the privacy of this airspace. And perhaps most importantly, this airspace 
                                                        
176  There actually may be ways to preserve the privacy of one’s airspace from physical in-
trusion. For example, a recent technology allows homeowners to register their address in a 
database that will be programmed into future drones, which should block the drone from en-
tering the airspace above their property. See Lily Hay Newman, Here’s How to Set Up a No-
Fly Drone Zone Over Your House, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (Feb. 10, 2015, 6:16 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/02/10/noflyzone_org_lets_you_geofence_the
_area_over_your_house_for_drones_to_avoid.html. 
177  The technological trespass doctrine expands upon the common-law trespass doctrine to 
invalidate certain government surveillances of the interior of the home taken from outside 
the home. The next section considers this doctrine, which does not rely on the location of the 
surveillance equipment itself. 
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is simply not used for the intimate, private activities enjoyed within one’s 
home—for which the constitution grants protection. The airspace might have 
some occasional private use, such as to grow a tree or build a tree house (this 
will vary on a case-by-case basis), but on the whole these uses are not meaning-
fully different from our uses for “open fields.” Therefore, this mid-altitude air-
space is probably not in the curtilage. 
4. Common-Law Trespass Conclusion 
In most cases then, the Court will not find that drone surveillance is a 
“search” based on the Jones physical trespass analysis, unless the drone flies 
very low or within the immediate reaches of a house. 
B. The Katz Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Analysis 
Likewise, the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine probably 
will not invalidate drone surveillance unless the drone flies at an uncommonly 
intrusive vantage point. The Katz test grants a Fourth Amendment right to our 
“reasonable expectations of privacy,” requiring that (1) the suspect harbor a 
subjective (actual) expectation of privacy, and (2) this expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.178 Private, low-altitude drone 
flights are becoming increasingly common, as is drone-spying between mem-
bers of the public.179 As a result, our “reasonable expectations of privacy” from 
most of the common uses of drones, including filming at low altitudes, are 
probably eroding.  
If the Supreme Court does not address whether a UAS flight occurrs in air-
space frequented by the public with “sufficient regularity,” and instead limits 
the inquiry into whether the flight is “lawful,”—or in “publically navigable air-
space”—the flight might be unconstitutional if it crosses into privately owned 
airspace. However, since some states, like Nevada, limit these property rights 
to be “subject to intrusion by lawful air flight,”180 an otherwise lawful flight 
through the private airspace will not constitute a tort. Therefore, in such states, 
the only relevant inquiries into a flight’s “lawfulness” would be applicable 
FAA regulations and any drone laws181 enacted in the coming years. Or the 
Court might wholly ignore whether the flight constituted a trespass under the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test, and consider only whether the flight 
complied with FAA regulations.  
Drone flights may be “unlawful” under the Supreme Court aerial surveil-
lance cases. The government likely will not run afoul of the FAA’s operational 
regulations (i.e., altitude and location requirements), but may very well conflict 
                                                        
178  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
179  See discussion supra Part I.C and notes 3–5 and accompanying text. 
180  McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110, 1120 (Nev. 2006). 
181  Those specifically controlling private conduct, not the conduct of the police. The law 
must control private conduct because that affects our reasonable expectation of privacy. 
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with future FAA or state privacy regulations. Effective enforcement of a law 
that prevents the public from using drones to spy could preserve a reasonable 
expectation of privacy from drones. Thus the government will need to obey 
these privacy laws in order to comply with the Fourth Amendment under Katz, 
even if the laws expressly exempt law enforcement. So under the “lawful 
flight” analysis alone, the government will not violate our reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy with a UAS surveillance that complies with drone flight regula-
tions unless these regulations include privacy protections that preclude home 
surveillance. 
But a majority of the Court in Riley held that the government’s surveillance 
flights must be limited to areas in which members of the public actually fly 
with sufficient regularity.182 If this is the sole question, and the lawfulness of 
the flight is irrelevant, then our reasonable expectations of privacy rely on the 
success of drone flight and privacy regulation enforcement. If drone laws are 
insufficiently enforced, and privacy-diminishing drone flights remain “suffi-
ciently regular,” then we will not have a reasonable expectation of privacy from 
them. But if the Court considers both the lawfulness of the flight and whether 
such flights are sufficiently regular, then the lawlessness of the flight alone may 
be enough to invalidate the flight. Under the current lack of drone laws, though, 
UAS flight likely will not violate the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine 
wherever drone flights are currently common (such as neighborhoods in major 
cities), but a drone flight will violate our reasonable expectations of privacy in 
places where drones are not sufficiently regular (perhaps in more rural towns).  
Further, there are several other considerations the Court will likely make 
when considering the constitutionality of a UAS surveillance of the interior of 
someone’s home or curtilage. The subjects of drone surveillance will have to 
argue that they were within a constitutionally protected area and that they did 
not knowingly expose themselves to a low altitude device peering into their 
home or backyard. For example, a person who the government films within her 
house through a sunroof or a second story window might argue that she did not 
knowingly expose herself through that window because she did not reasonably 
expect a person or filming device to fly-by—at least not one that would be 
close enough to observe her with any detail. This claim, of course, becomes in-
creasingly tenuous as drones proliferate amongst private consumers, and we 
come to expect their presence. How might a defendant successfully claim that 
she had a reasonable expectation of privacy from a commonly used, unregulat-
ed183 technology?  
A controlling question will be how private and commercial users common-
ly use drones. This important factor drives our “reasonable expectations of pri-
                                                        
182  See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 454 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 460 
(Brennan, J., dissenting, with whom Marshall, J., and Stevens, J., join); id. at 467–68 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
183  Or, more likely in the future, unregulated due to lack of effective drone regulation en-
forcement. 
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vacy.” In the light of unclear law, private drones will continue to fly generally 
unfettered. The FAA currently maintains a right to ban commercial use of 
drones without a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (“COA”), but does not 
require approval or a waiver for hobby drone flying. The FAA “strongly en-
courage[s]” UAS hobbyists to follow the agency’s UAS safety guidelines,184 
but the agency says little about flying around people’s homes. As long as pri-
vate hobby drone operators safely fly drones below 400 feet,185 they appear to 
have little reason to worry about federal regulations at the present time. 
What about state and local regulations? Many states have enacted, or are 
considering enacting, drone regulations.186 And laws already exist that may al-
ready proscribe private drone spying. For example, a creative California prose-
cutor might charge a private drone-using peeping tom with a misdemeanor un-
der existing privacy laws.187 
If enforcement of drone privacy regulations proves inadequate, and the 
public continues to engage in intrusive drone activities largely unfettered, do 
we still have a reasonable expectation of privacy from drone flights? This is 
where conflict emerges between the plurality’s approach in Riley, which re-
quires the government’s flight to simply be “lawful,”188 and the O’Connor ap-
proach agreed upon by a majority of the Riley Court, which would require the 
government’s flight to occur in a place frequented by private citizens with “suf-
ficient regularity.”189 
The popularity of drones for private and commercial use leaves it in the 
hands of legislators and law enforcement to regulate where and how the public 
fly drones. Unfortunately, enforcing drone flight regulations will probably pre-
sent a severe challenge. On one hand, there may be a federalism problem. 
Whose job is it to promulgate and enforce such drone regulations, which impli-
cate national, state, and local concerns? Does the FAA have exclusive authority 
to regulate anything above the ground? Or can state and local governments en-
act and enforce laws to protect the safety and privacy of their citizens?190 
                                                        
184  See Model Aircraft Operations, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/model 
_aircraft (last modified Mar. 4, 2015, 1:17 PM). 
185  See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 66. 
186  See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
187  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. See also Drone Leads to Criminal Case Over 
Privacy in Middle Tennessee, LOCAL8NOW.COM (June 2, 2015, 6:53 PM), http://www.lo 
cal8now.com/home/headlines/Drone-leads-to-criminal-case-over-privacy-in-Middle-
Tennessee-305910091.html. 
188  See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989). 
189  See id. at 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting, with whom 
Marshall, J., and Stevens, J., join); id. at 467–68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
190  “[T]he protection of a person’s general right to privacy—his right to be let alone by oth-
er people—is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of 
the individual States.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967) (footnote omit-
ted). 
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There are also practical limitations to drone regulation.191 Will federal 
agents really have the resources to pursue a meaningful number of reported vio-
lations of federal drone regulations by private hobbyists? Even on the local lev-
el, the stealth manner in which users can operate their drones might prove to be 
a significant obstacle to local law enforcement. Drones provide a particularly 
effective way to spy while avoiding personal detection. Even when the location 
of the drone itself is conspicuous, the operator herself might fly the drone from 
an out-of-sight position, using first person view (“FPV”),192 or she could sneak-
ily fly the drone by line-of-sight193 from a well-concealed location. Currently, 
NASA and Verizon Wireless are exploring a potentially promising enforcement 
solution: using cell phone towers to track drones.194 And the military is explor-
ing other enforcement solutions.195 
But if drone privacy laws are not enacted, or not adequately enforced 
against private drone operators, courts may simply cite how private hobbyists 
and commercial users fly drones around our neighborhoods with “sufficient 
regularity,” thus destroying any reasonable expectation of privacy from drones. 
Alternatively, the Court might take the plurality’s approach in Riley, citing the 
lawfulness of the drone flight, and affirming that we have no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy from observations made from a lawful vantage point—at least 
by the naked eye.196 A low-resolution camera on a drone might be equivalent to 
the naked eye. 
However, the equation changes if the government attaches more advanced 
imaging equipment on the drone, or if it flies in entirely uncommon or unlawful 
airspace. For example, if the government equips the drone with a thermal imag-
ing camera, the Court could resolve the case under the Kyllo technological tres-
pass standard, likely deeming the surveillance unconstitutional.197 Or if the 
                                                        
191  See Craig Whitlock, Near-Collisions Between Drones, Airliners Surge, New FAA Re-
ports Show, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/near-collisions-between-drones-airliners-surge-new-faa-reports-show/2014/11/26/9 
a8c1716-758c-11e4-bd1b-03009bd3e984_story.html (“The aviation-safety agency lacks the 
manpower to police airports or effectively track down offenders. Only a handful of rogue 
drone operators have been apprehended or penalized across the country.”). 
192  See, e.g., Parrot Bebop Drone, PARROT, http://www.parrot.com/usa/products/bebop-
drone (last visited Nov. 24, 2015). 
193  FAA guidance says that hobby drone operators should fly drones within visual line of 
sight. UAS Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 2. 
194  Mark Harris, NASA and Verizon Plan to Monitor U.S. Drone Network from Phone Tow-
ers, GUARDIAN (June 3, 2015, 11:39 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun 
/03/verizon-nasa-drones-cellphone-towers. 
195  See Richard Whittle, Military Exercise Black Dart to Tackle Nightmare Drone Scenario, 
N.Y. POST (July 25, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://nypost.com/2015/07/25/military-operation-black-
dart-to-tackle-nightmare-drone-scenario. 
196  Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989). 
197  On the other hand, thermal-imaging devices might no longer create a per se constitution-
al violation. At the time that the Supreme Court decided Kyllo, thermal imaging was an ex-
pensive and less common technology. Now, it is much more common. See Katie Barlow, 
Thermal Imaging Gets More Common but the Courts Haven’t Caught Up, NPR (Feb. 27, 
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government uses high-resolution cameras, which can make detailed observa-
tions that would be impossible by the naked eye, the Court might decide that 
the suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy from such observation. Al-
so, if the drone flies a few feet away from someone’s window, a few inches 
from the ground, above 400 feet, or in another area the Court may deem “un-
lawful,” it is quite likely that the Court will recognize the suspect’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy, deeming the drone flight to be a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 But will the subject of drone surveillance be able to demonstrate an actual, 
subjective expectation of privacy from drones? To assert a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, the subject of drone surveillance will have to prove that she 
sought privacy from the particular medium of government invasion (i.e., in 
Katz, the “uninvited ear”). In a drone surveillance case, the suspect will have to 
assert that she sought privacy from the “uninvited eye” or “uninvited camera.” 
Framed broadly, it seems plausible that a person in her home or curtilage has a 
subjective expectation of privacy from the uninvited eye or camera. But the 
Court will likely frame the issue more narrowly, as it did in its previous aerial 
surveillance cases: did the defendant seek to exclude the uninvited eye from 
above?198 The answer here might be no. Without taking certain unusual privacy 
measures, like drawing all curtains or extending a covered patio over her entire 
backyard, how will the suspect demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy 
from a drone flying closely above? Is this what is required to preserve our pri-
vacy?199 
With drones in wide public and private circulation, some in the judiciary 
may believe that we have to adjust our expectations of privacy to accommodate 
them.200 Paradoxically, our constitutional interests in privacy under the Katz 
reasonable expectation of privacy test are at the ever-dwindling mercy of “soci-
ety”201—a society that is rapidly embracing electronic surveillance technology 
for private use. Thus, due to the wide circulation of drones, and the potential 
difficulties in enforcing drone regulations against private users, the Court will 
not find a government UAS surveillance to be a “search” under the Katz rea-
                                                                                                                                 
2014, 12:43 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/02/25/282523377 (de-
scribing an iPhone attachment that will let you carry a thermal imaging camera in your 
pocket for less than $350). “[T]echnology often changes faster than the law, and now ther-
mal imaging technology is available at our fingertips.” Id. Therefore, if the Court limits the 
Kyllo technological trespass doctrine to technologies that are “not in general public use,” 
thermal imaging might now pass constitutional muster. 
198  See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211–12 (1986). 
199  In Riley, the suspect had no reasonable expectation of privacy in part because of slight 
openings in the backyard greenhouse visible by helicopter. Riley, 488 U.S. at 448–49. 
200  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“New 
technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy . . . .”). 
201  The second prong of the Katz analysis, according to Justice Harlan, is that our privacy 
expectations only receive constitutional protection if they are ones that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
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sonable expectation of privacy test. Only well-enforced drone regulations 
against private users might change this outcome under the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy doctrine. Or the Court might apply an entirely different Fourth 
Amendment analysis to drone surveillance. 
C. The Kyllo Technological Trespass Analysis 
 In Kyllo, Justice Scalia rejected the Katz test as ineffective and overly sub-
jective, and also lamented that the common-law physical trespass test will be-
come outdated and ineffective if not adapted to advancing technology.202 
Therefore, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, expanded upon the definition of 
a “trespass” under the common-law trespass test.203 Under this expanded defini-
tion of trespass, the government engages in a “search” when it utilizes sense-
enhancing technology to gather information about the interior of the home, 
which would otherwise only be obtainable by physical entry into a constitu-
tionally protected area.204 The Court indicated it might limit this doctrine to 
technologies that are “not in general public use.”205 If the Court expands the 
doctrine in a logical manner to proscribe technologies that may actually be in 
general public use—like UAS—it would create a normative doctrine that does 
not diminish its protections due to the changing activities and norms of society. 
Due to the irrelevance of the reasonable expectation of privacy and com-
mon-law physical trespass tests to modern popular technologies,206 privacy ad-
vocates might consider arguing that drone surveillance violates the Fourth 
Amendment under the the Kyllo technological trespass doctrine. This is likely 
the best doctrine by which future courts may address technological surveil-
lance. However, whether the Kyllo technological trespass doctrine will pro-
scribe warrantless UAS surveillance will depend on whether the Supreme Court 
limits the doctrine to technologies that are not in “general public use.”207  
If the Supreme Court abandons this “general public use” limitation, crimi-
nal defendants may successfully argue that surveillance by a low flying drone is 
a technological trespass, and therefore a “search” under the Fourth Amend-
ment. But if the Court limits the application of the doctrine to technologies “not 
                                                        
202  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 26, 34 (2001). 
203  See id. 
204  See id. 
205  See id. 
206  See discussion supra Part II. 
207  For a thorough discussion of the “general public use” prong of the Kyllo technological 
trespass doctrine, see Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amend-
ment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. 
REV. 1393, 1396 (2002) (arguing that “the extent to which a particular technological device 
is used by the general public, and the related inquiries into whether it is ‘generally available’ 
or ‘highly sophisticated,’ should be irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis”). According-
ly, if the Court choses to exclude the technological trespass doctrine from devices in “gen-
eral public use,” the doctrine will be no more useful than the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy doctrine to address UAS surveillance. 
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in general public use,” the doctrine will suffer the same ineffectiveness as the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test at addressing new technologies that be-
come popular. Because of the popularity of drones, drones are likely in “gen-
eral public use.” 
 If privacy advocates succeed in expanding the Kyllo technological trespass 
doctrine to encompass technologies that are in general public use, they will 
probably succeed in arguing that drone technology fits within the sort of tech-
nology contemplated by the Court in Kyllo. Drones, like thermal imaging de-
vices, allow the government to obtain information about the inside of the home 
that it otherwise could only obtain by physical entry. Both the UAS and the 
thermal imaging device in Kyllo gather this information by utilizing unusual 
perspectives into the home, apart from the traditional street-level or high-
altitude viewing points. Also, both technologies are fully effective from public 
lawful vantage points.208  
Drones can conduct surveillance from virtually any angle and at low alti-
tude right near the home. This reality eviscerates previous notions that no one 
can see through certain windows or into the home from certain angles except 
by far away aircraft with binoculars or high-resolution cameras, just as thermal 
imaging eviscerates previous notions that no one can see (or infer) the internal 
temperature of the home without entering. Indeed, UAS grant far more infor-
mation to the government about the interior of a home than a thermal imaging 
device can grant. And because of the potentially clandestine nature of a drone 
flight, drones may provide a desirable alternative to physical entry (i.e., the ob-
server is more likely to catch people in truly vulnerable, private moments). 
UAS will be able to reveal untold reaches of the interior of the home or curti-
lage by utilizing unusual vantage points from which home dwellers are not ac-
customed to obscuring view.209 Thus, drones and thermal imaging devices both 
grant observers super-human ability—here, flight—that allows them to collect 
vast amounts of information about the interior of the home otherwise only at-
tainable by physical entry. 
Moreover, current drone technology typically operates aloft only for a mat-
ter of hours,210 but certain UAS devices, called high-altitude long-endurance 
(HALE) UAS, will have the potential to operate in the air for extremely pro-
longed periods of time (even years), which will enable them to gather long-
term information about the ground, including constitutionally protected areas 
                                                        
208  In the case of UAS, lawfully navigable airspace for unmanned aircraft. In the case of 
thermal imaging devices, from public streets or sidewalks. 
209  For example, a drone would have little trouble peering down into a sunroof above one’s 
living room. Sunroofs often do not come with curtains. Along the same line of logic, drones 
will have little trouble peering into our second-story windows at angles that no one else in 
the neighborhood could see, without climbing onto the roof of their home or hauling a ladder 
into the middle of the street. Additionally, even smaller openings in sheds and greenhouses 
will be more revealing than the openings in Florida v. Riley, because drones could have a 
closer view. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989). 
210  Villasenor, supra note 33. 
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such as our backyards and other parts of the curtilage.211 Without secretly 
camping out in someone’s backyard for several days, one could not gather the 
sort of intimate information that the government will be able to gather with the-
se long-term HALE UAS operations. For now, however, HALE technology is 
not as pressing as small low-altitude UAS.212 
Additionally, the fact that there are other less practical—or illegal—non-
trespassory means by which to gather this information is irrelevant to the tech-
nological trespass doctrine. In Kyllo, the Court was not persuaded by the fact 
that one could have learned about the heat within the house by observing, via 
visible light, heat waves emitting off the home or snow melting on the roof.213 
Likewise, one could utilize a ladder to achieve at least a few of the unique van-
tage points available to UAS—although a ladder would be far more conspicu-
ous, impractical, and would often not be as close-up to a window as a drone can 
be. Moreover, such activity is socially unacceptable, uncommon, and may vio-
late many states’ privacy laws.214 These facts keep this alternative to drone use, 
and others like it, nonviable for the police and thus constitutionally irrele-
vant.215 
 Of course, UAS technology is different from thermal imaging technology 
in several significant ways. First, when the police use a simple (or even high-
resolution) camera on a UAS, they will be conducting surveillance of visible 
light (albeit from unique angles and possibly in improved resolution). Visible 
light observations are the exact sort of observations home dwellers are accus-
tomed to and are most prepared to protect against, unlike observations of their 
thermal emissions. In Kyllo, the Court weighed in the defendant’s favor be-
cause thermal imaging technology detected emissions from the home other than 
visible light—that is, the technology made observations that passersby were un-
likely to make.216 However, although UAS normally will make visible light ob-
servations, they will do so from unusual and intrusive vantage points.  
                                                        
211  The solar-powered QinetiQ Zephyr stayed aloft for over two continuous weeks. See 
Chuter, supra note 33. Also, Boeing is working on a HALE UAS called the SolarEagle, 
which will remain aloft in the stratosphere for up to five years. See Press Release, Boeing 
Co., supra note 33. 
212  See Villasenor, supra note 33 (“It will likely be much later in the decade before HALE 
technology becomes sufficiently advanced and cost-effective to make it practical to install a 
permanent HALE presence above an American city. Currently, there is no indication that 
any government agency plans to do so.”). 
213  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 n.2, 43 (2001). 
214  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
215  It is hardly conceivable that the Court would deem a violation of state privacy laws to be 
a viable alternative to the electronic surveillance in question and a physical intrusion. There-
fore, under the Kyllo non-alternative analysis (that the police may not use technology that 
permits them to gather information only otherwise attainable by physical intrusion into the 
home), the existence of illegal means (per state law) to achieve the same surveillance objec-
tives cannot serve as a satisfactory alternative to physical intrusion into the home, which 
would validate the use of drones. 
216  See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29. 
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Also, the government might be able to use thermal imaging in a more clan-
destine manner than flying many low-altitude, four-rotor (“quadcopter”) UAS. 
Depending on the model, many quadcopter UAS generate a significant amount 
of noise, at least for now.217 This fact offers little solace to someone inside her 
home, who might not hear it, or to one who is out while a drone scours her 
backyard. 
1.  General Public Use 
For a drone surveillance analysis, a critically important development in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence remains to be seen: whether the Court will 
adopt the “not in general public use” limitation to the technological trespass 
doctrine. The Court was not confronted with a technology that was in general 
public use in Kyllo, so when the Court commented that its doctrine applied “at 
least where . . . the technology in question is not in general public use,” this 
comment might simply have been dicta, and not controlling on a drone case.218 
And even if this limitation is the law, what “general public use” means is en-
tirely unclear.219 Professor Slobogin suggests, “There are at least three broad 
definitions of that phrase (general availability, general use, and general use for 
a particular purpose) and each of those definitions can be subdivided into alter-
native definitions that vary widely.”220 Let us consider the possibility that “in 
general public use” means either the popularity of a product (which relies, in 
part, on its availability), or that the phrase regards a device’s “general use for a 
particular purpose.” Either of these meanings create a doctrine that dwindles its 
protections upon the proliferation of technology.  
In Kyllo, the Court concluded that the government utilized an invasive 
technology that was not in general public use.221 In contrast, the Court will like-
                                                        
217  For a crude example of the noise made by one of the most common brands of quadcop-
ters, see kd7und, How Loud Is a DJI Phantom?, YOUTUBE (Apr. 24, 2013), https://www.you 
tube.com/watch?v=afi4tSZw-kc (showing a private individual recording eighty-two decibels 
from a quadcopter one foot away). A sergeant with the Miami-Dade Police Department de-
scribed the department’s eighteen-pound drone to the National Journal: “Our drone looks 
like a flying garbage can, and it sounds like a weed whacker. This thing is very, very noisy. 
It wouldn’t allow you to sneak up on anybody.” Jay Stanley, If Drones Get Quiet, ACLU: 
FREE FUTURE (May 2, 2012, 5:48 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/if-drones-get-quiet. Some 
worry, therefore, about the inevitable development of quiet drones. See id. 
 (speculating that silencing drones will erase the primary form of notice that a drone is pre-
sent, and commenting that notice is “one of the key principles of privacy”). 
218  See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; see also Slobogin, supra note 207, at 1432 n.179. 
219  Slobogin, supra note 207, at 1402 (“Despite the number of cases mentioning the issue, 
the general public use concept remains amorphous. As noted above, a number of courts seem 
to believe that flashlights and binoculars, and perhaps night scopes as well, are in general 
public use. The Supreme Court has indicated that airplanes (in navigable airspace) and 
mapmaking cameras are as well, but that thermal imagers and (probably) beepers are not. 
But no court has put forth a more general definition of the concept.”). 
220  Id. at 1411. 
221  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
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ly find drones to be in general public use, and drone surveillance to be the par-
ticular purpose for the public’s drone use. Not only are many models of drones 
substantially less expensive222 and more readily available to the public than 
thermal imaging technology was at the time of Kyllo, drones are far more popu-
lar (due to their entertainment value).223 In the United States, the integration of 
UAS into the national airspace “is expected to have enormous economic and 
job creation impacts in the United States,” and is expected to be an industry 
worth $82.1 billion.224 Drones are already popular for private use, and will soon 
be popular for commercial use as well. Therefore, the Court will probably find 
drones to be in “general public use” if the Court adopts a broad meaning for 
this phrase. The popularity of drones may thus dispose of a technological tres-
pass claim. 
 Alternatively, the Court might choose to adopt a narrower meaning for the 
“general public use” limitation, and instead focus the test on how the govern-
ment used the drone technology. Specifically, the Court might hold that when a 
technology that is in “general public use” for one purpose—such as, for recrea-
tion—that does not mean that the technology is in “general public use” for all 
purposes—such as, for surveillance. For example, even if drones are generally 
popular for recreational flying at a park or other public venue, this does not 
mean that the general public use for drones is to conduct surveillance on your 
neighbor’s home. Under this narrower test, the “general public use” exception 
to the technological trespass doctrine would exist only if the government uses 
the technology in the same manner as the general public. 
Narrowing the “general public use” test in this way would make the tech-
nological trespass doctrine practically indistinguishable from the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test, at least where popular technology is concerned. The 
                                                        
222  I was quickly able to find a drone with a camera available, on sale, for only $49.95. See 
RC Helicopters w/ Camera, THINK RC, http://www.thinkrc.com/24ghz-4ch-hubsan-h107c-
mini-quadcopter-camera-blackgreen-p-2680.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2015). Admittedly, 
this is quite cheap. One of the most popular drone brands right now, the “DJI Phantom” runs 
roughly between $500 and $1300. See All Products: Phantom Series, DJI, 
http://www.dji.com/products (last visited Nov. 25, 2015). 
223  Affordable, small drones, affixed with cameras, open the skies up to the everyday person 
without having to acquire a pilot license and a plane or helicopter. People have thought up 
many very cool uses for drones. For example, one of the most popular uses for drones is 
filming yourself doing athletic or extreme sports activities. Drones are being programmed to 
automatically follow their owners, and film them while they do activities like snowboard or 
mountain climb. See Stothard, supra note 3 (“It would be like having a full TV crew with 
you when you went snowboarding or mountain climbing . . . .”). “Lego was an amazing toy 
20 years ago. You could create a whole world. But today’s kids are different and they require 
something more special and technological,” said Henri Seydoux, the chief executive of Par-
rot, a French Technology company that manufactures drones. Id. 
224  DARRYL JENKINS & BIJAN VASIGH, ASS’N FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE SYS. INT’L, THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS INTEGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 20 
(2013), http://www.auvsi.org/econreport (follow “To download the full report” hyperlink) 
(reporting that “[d]uring the 11-year period 2015–2025, UAS integration is expected to con-
tribute $82.1 billion to the nation’s economy” mostly due to the agriculture industry). 
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standards would rely upon the same factors. Under either doctrine, the Court 
will invalidate the UAS surveillance if the government uses the technology in 
an uncommon, and thus reasonably unexpected, manner. For instance, if UAS 
remain popular, but well-enforced privacy regulations prevent the public from 
utilizing them to spy on one another, then the government will violate both the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test and the technological trespass test, be-
cause it will use the technology in an uncommon way.225 But if the government 
uses the technology in accord with the usage common of the general public—
which likely includes filming around a neighborhood—then it will pass this 
test. Therefore, if the doctrine takes on this meaning, our privacy from UAS 
surveillance will depend upon the effectiveness of drone legislation in prevent-
ing the general public from using drones to spy on one another. 
2.  Technological Trespass Doctrine Conclusion 
Therefore, whether and how the Court adopts the “general public use” test 
in a UAS case will be of central importance to the technological trespass test. 
Privacy advocates should argue for an abandonment of the “not in general pub-
lic use” limitation of the Kyllo trespass doctrine, arguing that such a limitation 
would make the doctrine ineffective in addressing advancing technologies as 
they become popular (just like the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy doc-
trine).  
There are likely three possible outcomes under the technological trespass 
doctrine. First, if the Court does not adopt the “general public use” test in UAS 
surveillance cases, the technological trespass doctrine will invalidate govern-
ment surveillance whenever the government utilizes a sense- or ability-
enhancing technology to gather information otherwise practically obtainable 
only by a physical trespass. Under this analysis, the Court will find the use of a 
UAS to observe the curtilage of the home, even from a lawful vantage point, to 
be a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Second, if the Court limits the technological trespass doctrine to only those 
technologies “not in general public use,” the Court will consider the popularity 
and accessibility of drones to the public, and may hold that drones are in “gen-
eral public use.” Thus, UAS surveillance with a drone will not violate the Kyllo 
technological trespass doctrine, and will pass constitutional muster. 
Third, if the Court adopts a narrower interpretation of the “general public 
use” test, requiring the government to use drones in the same manner as the 
general public, legal surveillance of homes by drone may depend on whether 
legislatures effectively prevent members of the public from spying on each oth-
er’s homes. If the government uses drones to peer into the interior of the home 
or curtilage, and this activity is not common of the general public, the search 
                                                        
225  For example, California has a criminal law that very well may apply to a person using a 
drone to peer into the private areas of another person’s home. See supra note 7 and accom-
panying text. 
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will violate the technological trespass doctrine and the Fourth Amendment. 
Under this analysis, the Supreme Court’s Kyllo doctrine would become practi-
cally indistinguishable from the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, in 
which our privacy rights depend on the conduct we expect of members of the 
public.226 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Alito recently remarked: 
Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular expecta-
tions are in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in popular atti-
tudes. New technology may provide increased convenience or security at the ex-
pense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even 
if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology 
entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevi-
table.227 
Others are not satisfied with allowing technology to eviscerate the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections: “To withdraw protection of th[e] minimum expecta-
tion [of privacy in the home] would be to permit police technology to erode the 
privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”228 In response, the Supreme 
Court in Kyllo developed a technological trespass doctrine, which may have 
more potential than any other doctrine to meaningfully limit the government’s 
warrantless use of surveillance technologies in the age of diminishing privacy. 
As law enforcement increases the use of UAS for public safety and crimi-
nal justice purposes, UAS will serve an important role for our twenty-first cen-
tury public safety interests.229 However, like any other law enforcement tool, 
the usefulness of UAS should come with a strong dose of caution: “The great-
est dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding.”230 At the very core of our American con-
                                                        
226  See discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
227  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
228  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 26, 34 (2001). 
229  Some of the potential law enforcement uses of UAS include: accident reconstruction, 
Tactical or SWAT operations, intelligence and evidence gathering, traffic and crowd control, 
search and rescue, fire control and damage assessment, HAZMAT management, emergency 
and disaster response, and event and VIP security. See Considerations in Selecting a Small 
UAV for Police Operations, AERYON LABS INC. (May 3, 2011), http://aeryon.com/whitepa 
pers/whitepaperpolice. Moreover, UAS allow the police to save substantial amounts of mon-
ey in accomplishing these tasks, many of which are otherwise impossible, impractical, or 
only possible with a helicopter. See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 30, at 6–8; see also Dave 
Kroetsch, Choosing the Right UAV, 5 GEOSPATIAL WORLD, Sept. 2014, at 56, 56 (noting that 
law enforcement agency budgets for equipment purchases typically are between five and fif-
teen percent of the total budget). 
230  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice 
Brandeis also observed:  
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government’s 
purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty 
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stitutional system exists the inescapable tension between public safety and our 
liberty. 
As Benjamin Franklin famously declared, “Those who would give up es-
sential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty 
nor safety.”231 We must not take this statement to the extreme, however, and 
allow our principles to be our undoing. It is fundamental to even the most basic 
social contract that we agree to give up some freedom to purchase some safe-
ty.232 Therefore, the framers ensured that the proper degree of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment is always on balance with the People’s legitimate criminal 
justice and public safety interests.233 The trick, then, is finding exactly how 
much of our Liberty the Framers surrendered in order to purchase the benefits 
of effective law enforcement. 
Unmanned aerial systems will force the United States Supreme Court to 
reexamine its interpretation and construction of the Fourth Amendment. All of 
its current doctrines, without modification, appear insufficient to protect the 
privacy expectations we have come to enjoy. 
The doctrine by which the Supreme Court will most likely invalidate war-
rantless UAS surveillance of the home and curtilage will be an expansion of the 
Kyllo technological trespass doctrine. This expansion must be an adaptation of 
Kyllo that does not diminish its protections simply because a technology is 
popular, or in “general public use.” Under such an expansion of Kyllo, the gov-
ernment will engage in a trespass, and therefore a “search,” when it uses any 
sense or ability-enhancing technology, however commonly used, to gather in-
formation about our “persons, houses, papers, or effects,”234 which the govern-
ment otherwise could not collect without a physical trespass. If the Court does 
not abandon the “not in general public use” dicta, the Kyllo doctrine will suffer 
the same ineffectiveness as the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test to 
address advancing technology. Alternatively, the Court might invalidate the 
surveillance if it uses drones in a way that the “general public” does not.235 
                                                                                                                                 
by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of 
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. 
Id. 
231  Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor (Nov. 11, 1755), in 6 THE PAPERS OF 
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 238, 242 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1963). 
232  For example, we agree not to kill and steal from one another in order to purchase the 
heightened security that comes from living in groups. 
233  Otherwise, the framers would not have limited the reach of the Fourth Amendment to 
“unreasonable” searches. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (“Absent 
more precise guidance from the founding era, we generally determine whether to exempt a 
given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree 
to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is 
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ” (quoting Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999))). 
234  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
235  In other words, if the Court retains the “not in general public use” limitation to the tech-
nological trespass doctrine, it may nonetheless invalidate warrantless use of popular technol-
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Absent this legal development, civil rights advocates have but one practical 
avenue through which to prevent warrantless UAS surveillance under the 
Fourth Amendment: legislation. If legislators direct drone privacy laws at pre-
venting private citizens from spying on one another, they might preserve our 
“reasonable expectations of privacy” from drones. But this legislation must 
come with effective enforcement, or it might do little for our constitutional 
rights. Such legislation would impact both the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy test and the Kyllo technological trespass test, allowing civil rights ad-
vocates to argue that the government was using the technology in a manner not 
common among the general public, and thus reasonably unexpected. 
                                                                                                                                 
ogies if the police use the technology in an uncommon way (i.e., spying on your neighbor 
with a drone, where local law prohibits the public from spying with a drone). 
